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1. Interpretation: Economic engagement is the expansion of state-to-state ties

Kahler and Kastner 6

(Kahler, Miles, Professor of Pacific International Relations at University of California, San Diego, and Kastner, Scott, associate professor of International Relations at the University of Maryland, 2006, “STRATEGIC USES OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE: ENGAGEMENT POLICIES IN SOUTH KOREA, SINGAPORE, AND TAIWAN”, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies University of California, San Diego) FS

Economic engagement—a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and effect an improvement in bilateral political relations—is the subject of growing, but still limited, interest in the international relations literature. The bulk of the work on economic statecraft continues to focus on coercive policies such as economic sanctions. The emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well-documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa 1994; Pollins 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known about how widespread strategies of economic engagement actually are: scholars disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno 2003). Furthermore, beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies in this regard have focused on policies adopted by great powers. But engagement policies adopted by South Korea and the other two states examined in this study, Singapore and Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics; instead, it may be more widespread than previously recognized.

#### “Economic engagement” is limited to expanding economic ties

Çelik 11 – Arda Can Çelik, Master’s Degree in Politics and International Studies from Uppsala University, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies, p. 11

Introduction

Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender stale to change the political behaviour of target stale. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway lo perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows "*It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations* ".(p523-abstact). It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that " *the direct and positive linkage of interests of stales where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction*.

1. Violation: The affirmative has the United States Supreme Court rule a US policy unconstitutional which does not involve the government of Cuba, and doesn't mecesarriily result in economic engagement

C. Voting issue

 1. Ground- relations disads, politics, and PICs out of government engagement are the core of the topic

 2. Limits- only predictable limit on a near infinite combination of companies, NGOs and individuals

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#### The 1ac is a recreation of the Truman Doctrine – a dream to advance the so-called “underdeveloped” nations out of their state of poverty – but this naïve dream became a nightmare; transforming the world in a hegemonic quest for economic power resulting in the pain, suffering, exploitation, and oppression of any and all who stood in the way

Escobar 1995 [Arturo, Kenan Distinguished Professor of Anthropology, UNC-Chapel Hill Director, Institute of Latin American Studies, UNC-Chapel Hill Adjunct Professor, Department of Geography, UNC-Chapel Hill Adjunct Professor, Department of Communications, UNC-Chapel Hill Fellow, Institute of Arts and Humanities, UNC Fellow, Center for Urban and Regional Research, UNC Facilitator, World Anthropologies Network / Red de Antropologías Mundiales Research Associate, Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia, Bogotá, “Encountering Development THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD” 1995, page 3-4]

IN HIS inaugural address as president of the United States on January 20, 1949, Harry Truman announced his concept of a “fair deal” for the entire world. An essential component of this concept was his appeal to the United States and the world to solve the problems of the “underdeveloped areas” of the globe. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate, they are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. For the first time in history humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people. . . . I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the bene®ts of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. . . . What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democractic fair dealing. . . . Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scienti®c and technical knowledge. (Truman [1949] 1964) The Truman doctrine initiated a new era in the understanding and management of world affairs, particularly those concerning the less economically accomplished countries of the world. The intent was quite ambitious: to bring about the conditions necessary to replicating the world over the features that characterized the ªadvancedº societies of the time - high levels of industrialization and urbanization, technicalization of agriculture, rapid growth of material production and living standards, and the widespread adoption of modern education and cultural values. In Truman's vision, capital, science, and technology were the main ingredients that would make this massive revolution possible. Only in this way could the American dream of peace and abundance be extended to all the peoples of the planet. This dream was not solely the creation of the United States but the result of the speci®c historical conjuncture at the end of the Second World War. Within a few years, the dream was universally embraced by those in power. The dream was not seen as an easy process, however; predictably perhaps, the obstacles perceived ahead contributed to consolidating the mission. One of the most influential documents of the period, prepared by a group of experts convened by the United Nations with the objective of designing concrete policies and measures ªfor the economic development of underdeveloped countries,º put it thus: There is a sense in which rapid economic progress is impossible without painful adjustments. Ancient philosophies have to be scrapped; old social institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of cast, creed and race have to burst; and large numbers of persons who cannot keep up with progress have to have their expectations of a comfortable life frustrated. Very few communities are willing to pay the full price of economic progress. (United Nations, Department of Social and Economic Affairs [1951], 15)1 The report suggested no less than a total restructuring of ªunderdevelopedº societies. The statement quoted earlier might seem to us today amazingly ethnocentric and arrogant, at best naive; yet what has to be explained is precisely the fact that it was uttered and that it made perfect sense. The statement exemplified a growing will to transform drastically two-thirds of the world in the pursuit of the goal of material prosperity and economic progress. By the early 1950s, such a will had become hegemonic at the level of the circles of power. This book tells the story of this dream and how it progressively turned into a nightmare. For instead of the kingdom of abundance promised by theorists and politicians in the 1950s, the discourse and strategy of development produced its opposite: massive underdevelopment and impoverishment, untold exploitation and oppression. The debt crisis, the Sahelian famine, increasing poverty, malnutrition, and violence are only the most pathetic signs of the failure of forty years of development. In this way, this book can be read as the history of the loss of an illusion, in which many genuinely believed. Above all, however, it is about how the ªThirdWorldº has been produced by the discourses and practices of development since their inception in the early post±World War II period.

#### Using rights justification for liberating the ‘oppressed third world' consolidates U.S hyper masculinity, resulting in economic devastation, environmental destruction and extraction, and indiscriminate massacres.

Mohanty 06

(Chandra Talpade, She is the women's studies department chair and professor of Women's and Gender Studies, Sociology, and the Cultural Foundations of Education and Dean's Professor of the Humanities at Syracuse University, “US Empire and the Project of Women’s Studies: Stories of citizenship, complicity and dissent”, Gender, Place and Culture, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 7–20, February 2006, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09663690600571209)//SK

A number of scholars including Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin (2004) conclude that since the last decades of the twentieth century, the US rules through the mechanisms of ‘informal empire’ managing the flow of corporate capital globally across and through the borders of nation/states, as well as through military interventions in countries that resist this form of capitalist globalization.2 However, I would argue that these mechanisms of informal and not violently visible empire building are predicated on deeply gendered, sexualized, and racial ideologies that justify and consolidate the hypernationalism, hypermasculinity, and neo-liberal discourses of ‘capitalist democracy’ bringing freedom to oppressed third world peoples—especially to third world women. The US war state mobilizes gender and race hierarchies and nationalist xenophobia in its declaration of internal and external enemies, in its construction and consolidation of the ‘homeland security’ regime, and in its use of the checkbook and cruise missile to protect its own economic and territorial interests. It mobilizes both languages of empire and imperialism to consolidate a militarized regime internally as well as outside its territorial borders. Bringing ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ (or more precisely the free market) to Afghanistan and Iraq most recently, then, has involved economic devastation, de-masculinization, destruction of cultural, historical, natural and environmental resources, and, of course, indiscriminate massacres in both countries. Similarly, ‘making the homeland safe’ has involved the militarization of daily life, increased surveillance and detention of immigrants, and a culture of authoritarianism fundamentally at odds with American liberal democratic ideals. If the larger, overarching project of the US capitalist state is the production of citizens for empire, then the citizens for democracy narrative no longer holds. Where US liberal democratic discourse posed questions about democracy, equality, and autonomy (the American dream realized), neo-liberal, militarist discourse poses questions about the free market, global opportunity, and the protection of US interests inside and outside its national borders. Capitalist imperialism is now militarist imperialism. Capitalist globalization is militarized globalization.

#### Our alternative is to use our scholarship to engage in epistemic disobediance. The affirmative's value claims gain privilege and confer neutrality every time they are repeated. Individual acts of rejection interrupt this habitualization of imperialism in educational spaces.

#### Corrective approaches fail: Any detrius of western knowledge must be rejected to delink the human from the creation of the non-human colonial other. As western scholars of privilege, this requires arguing for radical interventions.

Mignolo 13 (Walter D. Who Speaks for the “Human” in Human Rights?. Human Rights from a Third World Perspective: Critique, History and International Law. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Professor of semiotics at Duke University, PhD. rb)

¶ In this regard, Western imperial knowledge (that is, based on Greek and ¶ Latin categories and translated into modern European vernacular ¶ languages—Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, German, French and English) ¶ controls (e.g., owns) the concept of human. If you want to dispute it from the ¶ genealogy of thoughts of Arabic, Urdu, Russian, Aymara, Bambara, or any ¶ other language and experiences embedded in non-Western history or ¶ indirectly related to Western categories of thoughts (and indirection here ¶ refers to imperial expansion and colonization), you would have two options: ¶ to bend and accept what is human according to Western knowledge (grounded in Greek and Latin; that is, not in Greek and Arabic) is; or you would prefer to de-link, to engage in epistemic disobedience denouncing the ¶provincialism of the universal and engage in a collective, differential, ¶ planetary assumption that being human is not being Vitruvian, Christian or ¶ Kantian but is instead being able first to dispute the imperial definition ¶ humanity. Secondly it is to engage in building a society in which human is ¶ not defined and rhetorically affirming that we are all equal, but human will ¶ be what comes out of building societies on principles that prevent ¶ classification and ranking to justify domination and exploitation among ¶ people who are supposed to be equal by birth. If you decide this option, ¶ please do not attempt to provide a new truth, a new definition of what does it mean to be human that will correct the mistakes of previous definitions of human. Since there is no such entity, the second option would be decolonial, that is, to move away (de-link) from the imperial consequences of a ¶ standard of human, humanity and the related ideal of civilization. If you ¶ choose this option it doesn’t mean that you accept that you are not human ¶ and you are also a barbarian. On the contrary, placing yourself in the space ¶ that imperial discourse gave to lesser humans, uncivilized and barbarians, ¶ you would argue for radical interventions from the perspective of those who have been made barbarians, abnormal and uncivilized. That is, you will ¶ argue for justice and equality from the perspective and interests of those who ¶ lost their equality and have been subjected to injustices.

#### Collapse is coming-- even with infinite resources and zero population growth, there is no way civilization makes it past 2100.

Kotke 2008 (WM.H, Published Author, “Final Empire” http://www.rainbowbody.net/Finalempire/FEchap2.htm Cites MIT Study)

The standard extrapolation of the growth curves since the 1900’s can easily be drawn out to the end, though chances are very good that war, depression, nuclear disaster, or eco-catastrophe will occur sometime before then. We live in a material civilization. We can count the barrels of oil, we can count the acres of wheat fields, and we can count the number of people. All the scholars who created the MIT study did, was to put all of the numbers from all of the scholarly fields on computers and extrapolate. The thing the computer cannot do is anticipate unpredictable breakdowns in the world system.¶ The scholars did examine the possibilities of averting disaster (which assumes a very unlikely world society, nimble enough to coordinate a survival strategy). The scholars programmed the computers so as to double the estimated resource base, they created a model that assumed "unlimited" resources, pollution controls, increased agricultural productivity and "perfect" birth control. None of these or other aversion strategies could take the world system past 2100. ¶ The reason that the world system cannot go on with unlimited growth is because each of the five factors is interactive. If we assume unlimited fuels such as a simple fusion process, this simply drives the growth curves faster. There is more cheap fuel so the wheels of industry churn faster and resource exhaustion comes more quickly, population continues to climb and pollution climbs. If there is more food production, then population climbs and resources are exhausted more rapidly. If population is stabilized, resources still continue to decline and pollution increases because of increased consumption. If the factors of resources, food, and industrial output grow then population grows but the resulting pollution creates the negative feedback of having to maintain cancer hospitals and institutions for the birth defected and mutations caused by pollution as well as pollution damage to factors such as farm crops. ¶ Growth had been the fundamental pattern of the culture of civilization long before Alexander conquered the "known world." The difference now is that the growth is approaching its outer limits and soon will have nothing left to feed on. We have come to the final cycle in which civilization will fall into entropy because it cannot any longer be sustained. There are no more virgin continents to exploit. There are few remaining forests to cut down so that new soils can be exploited and exhausted. In addition to this, the world population is now counted in the billions. The world has never before known this kind of exponentially increasing volume of flow and consumption of food, resources and industrial poisons.¶ Because of these interactive forces world society is trapped within a system of cultural assumptions and patterns of behavior from which it cannot extricate itself. There is no way out. There will be a collapse of civilization. There is no question that there will be future famines in the ecologically devastated and desertified region of Ethiopia with its exploding human population, just as there is no question that civilization which eats up its resources and poisons the earth, will collapse. We are examining the process now in order to gain knowledge, because we are the people who will be attempting to live through the

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#### The United States federal government should request the governments of Brazil and Mexico engage in dialogue with Cuba on its behalf as per Iglesias. The United States federal government should implement any resulting policy recommendations made by Brazil and Mexico following the dialogue toward Cuba.

#### Solves the case and avoids politics

Iglesias, Commander in the U.S. Navy, 2012

[Carlos, United States Navy Commander, “United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba,” manuscript submitted in partial fulfillment of the Masters of Strategic Studies Degree at the US Army War College, United States Army War College Strategy Research Project] Idriss

Unlike the policy implications above, the major hurdle to this interest does not come from any continuation of the GOC, but from the rest of the world. International opposition to the perceived fairness and effectiveness of the economic sanctions has long posed an obstacle for U.S. policy. In the global scale, the problem is epitomized by the twenty consecutive years of near unanimous UN General Assembly resolution votes against the embargo. 96 More regionally, Spain and other European Union partners have strongly pushed to loosen sanctions. The arguments are straightforward and pragmatic, “since sanctions in place have not worked, it makes more sense to do things that would work, and (the next obvious one is to) change things.”97 Even more locally, Cuba has managed to generally retain positive feelings among the people of Latin American in spite of the country’s domestic realities.98 The rise of Raúl and any subsequent successions further complicated the problem of mustering international consensus. Several countries in the hemisphere see any new Cuban leadership as fresh opportunities to engage in common interests. The two largest Latin American countries, Brazil and Mexico, have both ascribed to this approach and have indicated their interests in forging new ties since Fidel’s stepped down.99 On the other hand, this international dissention does hold some prospect for leveraging U.S. soft power. An indirect approach would be to coordinate U.S. proxy actions with partner countries interested in Cuba. This has the double benefit of leveraging U.S. soft power without compromising legislated restrictions or provoking hard-line Cuban-American ire. In this approach, burgeoning relations with Brazil and Mexico would be strong candidates. Devoid of the “bullhorn diplomacy” that have marginalized U.S.-Cuban policy efficacy for decades, the U.S. could better engage the island through hemispherical interlocutors. At a minimum, U.S. interests would be advanced through the proxy insights of what is occurring on the island in addition to the potential displacement of anti-American influences (e.g. Chávez).100

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#### Congress pulling punches now - Obama’s investment of capital is key to dissuade hawks and AIPAC

John Hudson, “Despite AIPAC Lobbying, Obama Admin Calms Congress on Iran Talks,” Foreign Policy, 10/23/13

 On Wednesday, the Obama administration held its first classified briefing with Congress on its high-stakes nuclear talks with Iran. Despite deep skepticism of White House engagement with Iran -- and despite a fresh lobbying effort by AIPAC -- exiting lawmakers appeared mollified by the State Department's chief nuclear negotiator Wendy Sherman, who led this month's talks with Iran in Geneva. The talks between Iran and six world powers this month offer the Obama administration the chance to solve a key foreign policy goal: Preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon without the use of military force. But many in Congress fear Iran's newly-elected President Hassan Rouhani could be using the talks as a stalling tactic to reach breakout nuclear capacity. Despite those concerns, lawmakers expressed a willingness to give the administration's diplomatic efforts a chance. "All I know is that sanctions seem to be working and that's a positive," Rep. Dutch Ruppersberger (D-MD), ranking member of the Intelligence Committee, told The Cable. "If they weren't working, Iran would not be reaching out at this point." "I appreciate the administration coming up and briefing us on what's going on with the talks," said House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA), who rarely misses a chance to attack the administration's Middle East policies. "I fully support efforts at applying pressure and making sure there is a viable military threat so that perhaps a diplomatic resolution can occur ... I remain concerned about the threat of Iran's actions in terms of pursuing its goal of nuclear capability and will remain involved in oversight of that issue." The meeting was well-attended with members of various House committees, including Intelligence, Foreign Affairs, Appropriations and Financial Services, participating. Several powerful lawmakers whisked out of the classified briefing without speaking to the press, including House Intel chairman Mike Rogers (R-MI), State and Foreign Ops Appropriations Subcommittee chairwoman Kay Granger (R-TX), House Minority Whip Steny Hoyer (D-MD), and House Foreign Affairs chairman Ed Royce (R-CA). The consultations with Congress have coincided with an effort by AIPAC lobbyists to fire them up on the issue. Last week, the pro-Israel group sent a memo to lawmakers insisting that Iran does not have the right to enrich uranium. "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) does not speak about the right of enrichment," reads the memo, obtained by The Cable from a Congressional aide. "Even if there were such a right, Iran's extensive decades-long violations of the NPT would have negated it." The Rouhani government insists on the right to continue enriching uranium on its own soil, something the White House has hinted it might accept under stringent inspections, but hasn't officially accepted. Tehran has also yet to signal a clear willingness to shutter its underground, heavily-fortified nuclear plant at Qom, a source of particular concern for Israel because it is largely impervious to their air strikes, or to dismantle any of its centrifuges. An AIPAC official would not say how many lawmakers received the memo, but noted that it was also sent to media outlets. In any event, hawks in Congress appear to be pulling their punches, for the most part. (The sole exceptions appear to be Florida Senator Marco Rubio and Illinois Senator Mark Kirk, who want to add sanctions on Iran immediately.) Rep. Eliot Engel, ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and a prominent critic of Iran's nuclear program, said he was "satisfied with the briefing." "I thought it was laid out well," he said, noting that he remains adamant that the U.S. not relent on pressuring Iran until it dismantles its nuclear program. "We all have the same goal. We don't want Iran to have a nuclear weapon. There are various ways you can get there. They laid out some of their thoughts and ideas on it, which I can't share with you, but I certainly do think it's worthwhile talking to the Iranians and seeing if this is real." The next round of Iran talks begin in Geneva on Nov. 7.

Court decisions are heavily politicized, triggers GOP backlash.

Calabresi, 2008

[Massimo, TIME, 6-26, “Obama's Supreme Move to the Center Washington” Thursday, http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1818334,00.html]

When the Supreme Court issues rulings on hot-button issues like gun control and the death penalty in the middle of a presidential campaign, Republicans could be excused for thinking they'll have the perfect opportunity to paint their Democratic opponent as an out-of-touch social liberal. But while Barack Obama may be ranked as one of the Senate's most liberal members, his reactions to this week's controversial court decisions showed yet again how he is carefully moving to the center ahead of the fall campaign. On Wednesday, after the Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty was unconstitutional in cases of child rape, Obama surprised some observers by siding with the hardline minority of Justices Scalia, Thomas, Roberts and Alito. At a press conference after the decision, Obama said, "I think that the rape of a small child, six or eight years old, is a heinous crime and if a state makes a decision that under narrow, limited, well-defined circumstances the death penalty is at least potentially applicable, that that does not violate our Constitution." Then Thursday, after Justice Scalia released his majority opinion knocking down the city of Washington's ban on handguns, Obama said in a statement, "I have always believed that the Second Amendment protects the right of individuals to bear arms, but I also identify with the need for crime-ravaged communities to save their children from the violence that plagues our streets through common-sense, effective safety measures. The Supreme Court has now endorsed that view." John McCain's camp wasted no time in attacking, with one surrogate, conservative Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas, calling Obama's gun control statement "incredible flip-flopping." McCain advisor Randy Scheunemann was even tougher in a conference call Thursday. "What's becoming clear in this campaign," Scheunemann said, is "that for Senator Obama the most important issue in the election is the political fortunes of Senator Obama. He has demonstrated that there really is no position he holds that isn't negotiable or isn't subject to change depending on how he calculates it will affect his political fortunes." Politicians are always happy to get a chance to accuse opponents of flip-flopping, but McCain's team may be more afraid of Obama's shift to the center than their words betray. Obama has some centrist positions to highlight in the general election campaign on foreign policy and national security, social issues and economics. His position on the child rape death penalty case, for example, is in line with his record in Illinois of supporting the death penalty. He is on less solid ground on the gun ban as his campaign said during the primary that he believed the D.C. law was constitutional. A top legal adviser to Obama says both cases are consistent with his previous positions. "I don't see him as moving in his statements on the death penalty or the gun case," says Cass Sunstein, a former colleague of Obama's at the University of Chicago. Sunstein says Obama is "not easily characterized" on social issues, and says the Senator's support for allowing government use of the Ten Commandments in public, in some cases, is another example of his unpredictability on such issues. On the issue of gun control, he says Obama has always expressed a belief that the Second Amendment guarantees a private right to bear arms, as the court found Thursday. But Obama's sudden social centrism would sound more convincing in a different context. Since he wrapped up the primary earlier this month and began to concentrate on the independent and moderate swing voters so key in a general election, Obama has consistently moved to the middle. He hired centrist economist Jason Furman, known for defending the benefits of globalization and private Social Security accounts, to the displeasure of liberal economists. On Father's Day, Obama gave a speech about the problem of absentee fathers and the negative effects it has on society, in particular scolding some fathers for failing to "realize that what makes you a man is not the ability to have a child — it's the courage to raise one." Last week, after the House passed a compromise bill on domestic spying that enraged liberals and civil libertarians, Obama announced that though he was against other eavesdropping compromises in the past, this time he was going to vote for it. Whether Obama's new centrist sheen is the result of flip-flopping or reemphasizing moderate positions, the Supreme Court decisions have focused attention again on the role of the court in the campaign season. McCain himself is vulnerable to charges of using the Supreme Court for political purposes. Earlier this month, when the court granted habeas corpus rights to accused terrorist prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, McCain attacked the opinion in particularly harsh language, though advisers say closing the prison there is high on his list of actions to rehabilitate America's image around the world. Liberals are hoping that despite Obama's moderate response to the Supreme Court decisions, the issues alone will rally supporters to him. "What both of these decisions say to me is that the Supreme Court really is an election-year issue," says Kathryn Kolbert, president of People For the American Way. "We're still only one justice away from a range of really negative decisions that would take away rights that most Americans take for granted," she says. And Obama's run to the center surely won't stop conservatives from using the specter of a Democratic-appointed Supreme Court to try to rally support. "Its pretty clear that if he's elected and Justice Scalia or Kennedy retires that he's going to appoint someone who's very likely to reverse [the gun control decision]," says Eugene Volokh, a professor at the UCLA School of Law. Given how Obama has been responding to the recent Supreme Court decisions, however, you're not likely to hear him talking about appointing liberal justices much between now and November.

#### Agreement on Iranian proliferation solves regional tension, Iranian prolif, and war now – new congressional sanctions crush the fragile momentum

NIAC, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing the interests of the Iranian-American community, “NIAC Applauds US-Iran Diplomatic Progress, Warns Congress Against Sabotaging a Deal,” 10/16/2013. http://www.niacouncil.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=9893

Washington, DC - The National Iranian American Council released the following statement after the conclusion of diplomatic negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran in Geneva:¶ ¶ The National Iranian American Council (NIAC) applauds the U.S. and Iran for engaging in substantive, productive negotiations in Geneva over the past two days. Both Iran and the U.S. and other members of the P5+1 have declared their commitment to reaching a solution that introduces verifiable limits on Iran’s nuclear program and ends the nuclear standoff. Such an agreement is possible and achievable if each side remains committed to the diplomatic track and halts escalatory measures that have prevented diplomatic progress in the past.¶ ¶ Ahead of new negotiations that are scheduled for November 7 and 8, it is critical that the U.S. Congress not interfere. New sanctions legislation would sabotage this promising but fragile process. The Senate must not complicate the talks by tying the hands of the President or undermining confidence that the U.S. can reciprocate in these negotiations. A verifiable agreement to reduce tensions, ensure Iran never develops nuclear weapons, and prevent war is possible if Congress gives diplomacy a chance to succeed. The consideration of new sanctions would undermine a deal. ¶ ¶ The new, positive atmosphere surrounding talks is due, in large part, to a shift in tone and approach from each party. The P5+1, critically, showed flexibility by agreeing to discuss the endgame with Iran, departing from their previous focus on short-term confidence building measures. Each side must continue to focus on a pragmatic approach towards a shared vision for the endgame in order to overcome the deep, long-held mistrust that has fueled escalatory policies. ¶ ¶ Further credit should be given to the injection of political capital into the negotiating process. Direct talks between Kerry and Zarif on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, and the historic phone call between Presidents Obama and Rouhani, have helped to break the taboo of diplomatic contact between the U.S. and Iran. NIAC supports further bilateral discussions between the United States and Iran to continue progress on the nuclear issue, and to address other issues of concern at the earliest possible opportunity, including human rights and regional security.¶ ¶ However, in Congress, Rep. Trent Franks (R-AZ) introduced a war authorization along with 14 other Republicans. In the Senate, the Banking Committee is set to consider new sanctions that passed the House just days before the inauguration of Iran’s new President. If either measure passes, it would reinforce Iranian fears that the United States is really interested in regime change and is unwilling or unable to deliver sanctions relief that is required by any deal. It is time for those in Congress who are serious about preventing war and finding a diplomatic solution to the nuclear standoff to stand up against efforts to sabotage talks and box the U.S. into a military confrontation.

#### Deal prevents global nuclear war

Edelman, distinguished fellow – Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, ‘11

(Eric S, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February)

The reports of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and the Commission on the Prevention Of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, as well as other analyses, have highlighted the risk that a nuclear-armed Iran could trigger additional nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, even if Israel does not declare its own nuclear arsenal. Notably, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates— all signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (npt)—have recently announced or initiated nuclear energy programs. Although some of these states have legitimate economic rationales for pursuing nuclear power and although the low-enriched fuel used for power reactors cannot be used in nuclear weapons, these moves have been widely interpreted as hedges against a nuclear-armed Iran. The npt does not bar states from developing the sensitive technology required to produce nuclear fuel on their own, that is, the capability to enrich natural uranium and separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. Yet enrichment and reprocessing can also be used to accumulate weapons-grade enriched uranium and plutonium—the very loophole that Iran has apparently exploited in pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. Developing nuclear weapons remains a slow, expensive, and di⁄cult process, even for states with considerable economic resources, and especially if other nations try to constrain aspiring nuclear states’ access to critical materials and technology. Without external support, it is unlikely that any of these aspirants could develop a nuclear weapons capability within a decade.

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also oªered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads eªectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several diªerent ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might oªer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the npt since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT.

n-player competition

Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarinebased nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly,would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.

### Case

### Int’l Law

No arctic conflict

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Russian television contacted me last night asking me to go on a program about the race for Arctic resources. The ice is melting fast, and it was all the usual stuff about how there will be big strategic conflicts over the seabed resources -- especially oil and gas -- that become accessible when it's gone. The media always love conflict, and now that the Cold War is long gone, there's no other potential military confrontation between the great powers to worry about. Governments around the Arctic Ocean are beefing up their armed forces for the coming struggle, so where are the flashpoints and what are the strategies? It's great fun to speculate about possible wars. In the end I didn't do the interview because the Skype didn't work, so I didn't get the chance to rain on their parade. But here's what I would said to the Russians if my server hadn't gone down at the wrong time. First, you should never ask the barber if you need a haircut. The armed forces in every country are always looking for reasons to worry about impending conflict, because that's the only reason their governments will spend money on them. Sometimes they will be right to worry, and sometimes they will be wrong, but right or wrong, they will predict conflict. Like the barbers, it's in their professional interest to say you need their services. So you'd be better off to ask somebody who doesn't have a stake in the game. As I don't own a single warship, I'm practically ideal for the job. And I don't think there will be any significant role for the armed forces in the Arctic, although there is certainly going to be a huge investment in exploiting the region's resources. There are three separate "resources" in the Arctic. On the surface, there are the sea lanes that are opening up to commercial traffic along the northern coasts of Russia and Canada. Under the seabed, there are potential oil and gas deposits that can be drilled once the ice retreats. And in the water in between, there is the planet's last unfished ocean. The sea lanes are mainly a Canadian obsession, because the government believes the Northwest Passage that weaves between Canada's Arctic islands will become a major commercial artery when the ice is gone. Practically every summer, Prime Minister Stephen Harper travels north to declare his determination to defend Canada's Arctic sovereignty from -- well, it's not clear from exactly whom, but it's a great photo op. Canada is getting new Arctic patrol vessels and building a deep-water naval port and Arctic warfare training centre in the region, but it's all much ado about nothing. The Arctic Ocean will increasingly be used as a shortcut between the North Atlantic and the North Pacific, but the shipping will not go through Canadian waters. Russia's "Northern Sea Route" will get the traffic, because it's already open and much safer to navigate. Then there's the hydrocarbon deposits under the Arctic seabed, which the U.S. Geological Survey has forecast may contain almost one-fourth of the world's remaining oil and gas resources. But from a military point of view, there's only a problem if there is some disagreement about the seabed boundaries. There are only four areas where the boundaries are disputed. Two are between Canada and its eastern and western neighbours in Alaska and Greenland, but there is zero likelihood of a war between Canada and the United States or Denmark (which is responsible for Greenland's defence). In the Bering Strait, there is a treaty defining the seabed boundary between the United States and Russia, signed in the dying days of the Soviet Union, but the Russian Duma has refused to ratify it. The legal uncertainty caused by the dispute, however, is more likely to deter future investment in drilling there than lead to war. And then there was the seabed-boundary dispute between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea, which led Norway to double the size of its navy over the past decade. But last year, the two countries signed an agreement dividing the disputed area right down the middle and providing for joint exploitation of its resources. So no war between NATO (of which Norway is a member) and the Russian Federation. Which leaves the fish, and it's hard to have a war over fish. The danger is rather that the world's fishing fleets will crowd in and clean the fish out, as they are currently doing in the Southern Ocean around Antarctica. If the countries with Arctic coastlines want to preserve this resource, they can only do so by creating an international body to regulate the fishing. And they will have to let other countries fish there, too, with agreed catch limits, since they are mostly international waters. They will be driven to co-operate, in their own interests. So no war over the Arctic. All we have to worry about now is the fact the ice is melting, which will speed global warming (because open water absorbs far more heat from the sun than highly reflective ice), and ultimately melt the Greenland icecap and raise sea levels worldwide by seven metres. But that's a problem for another day.

Arctic conflict is impossible – cooperation solves

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INTRODUCTION Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union squared off on opposite sides of the Arctic Ocean. Nuclear submarines prowled the depths, while long-range bombers circled overhead. A more cooperative approach emerged after 1990, with Moscow and Washington negotiating a boundary in the Bering Strait, Bering Sea, and Chukchi Sea that year. In 1996, the eight Arctic countries—Russia, United States, Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland—created the Arctic Council to provide an inter-governmental forum for the discussion of nonmilitary issues. On the security front, the Russian government allowed Soviet-era warships to rust-out, while the U.S. and Canadian governments chose not to replace aging ice-breakers. More recently, climate change and rising oil prices have given rise to concerns about possible struggles for territory and resources. In August 2007, Artur Chilingarov, the deputy speaker of the Russian Duma, caused a media frenzy by planting a titanium flag on the seabed at the North Pole and declaring "the Arctic is Russian."1 Canadian foreign minister Peter MacKay responded: "Look, this isn't the fifteenth century. You can't go around the world and just plant flags and say, 'We're claiming this territory.' Our claims over our Arctic are very well established."2 In October 2008, the European Parliament stirred things up further by calling for a new multilateral convention modeled on the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.3 In doing so, it was implicitly questioning the extensive rights of Arctic Ocean coastal states under the law of the sea. That same year, Scott Borgerson wrote: "The combination of new shipping routes, trillions of dollars in possible oil and gas resources, and a poorly defined picture of state ownership makes for a toxic brew."4 Cooler heads have since prevailed. One of the Russian scientists involved in the North Pole flag plant admitted that it was a publicity stunt lacking in legal relevance. Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig invited his counterparts from the other four Arctic Ocean coastal states (Canada, Norway, Russia, and the U.S.) to Ilulissat, Greenland, where they reaffirmed their commitment to resolving disputes within an existing framework of international law.5 The European Union issued an Arctic policy that recognized the primacy of the law of the sea in a region which, unlike the Antarctic, is centered on an ocean.6 U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke of the need for Arctic countries to work together: "We need all hands on deck because there is a huge amount to do, and not much time to do it."7 And in May 2011, the Arctic countries signed a multilateral search-and-rescue treaty, the first legal instrument negotiated within the framework of the Arctic Council.8 They also created a permanent secretariat for the Council, thus transforming it from an inter-governmental forum into a fully-fledged international organization. As the following review will demonstrate, all this cooperation is made easier by the fact that most Arctic sovereignty disputes have either been resolved or are actively being negotiated. In short, there is no competition for territory or resources in the Arctic, and no prospect of conflict either. RESOLVED SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES 1973 Canada-Denmark Boundary Treaty In 1973, Canada and Denmark agreed to divide the ocean floor between Canada and Greenland using an equidistance line, i.e. a line which at every point is an equal distance from each of the two opposing coasts. Since then, they have also used the resulting 1450 nautical mile boundary to define their fishing zones, meaning that the continental shelf delimitation has informally become an all-purpose maritime boundary. 1990 Bering Sea Treaty There is no sovereignty dispute between Russia and the United States because Moscow and Washington negotiated a 1390 nautical mile all-purpose maritime boundary in 1990.9 The treaty contains some important innovations, including the use of so-called "special areas"—whereby sovereign rights generated as the result of proximity to one treaty partner's coastline, but cut-off from that coastline by the newly agreed boundary, are transferred to the other treaty partner so as to maximize their combined areas of national jurisdiction. Although the treaty was never ratified by the Russian Duma, it is fully respected in practice and could, eventually, become binding by prescription. 2006 Denmark-Norway Boundary Treaty In 2006, Denmark and Norway negotiated an all-purpose maritime boundary between Greenland and the Norwegian Arctic archipelago of Svalbard.10 Roughly 430 nautical miles long, the boundary is based on the equidistance principle. 2010 Barents Sea Treaty In 2010, Norway and Russia settled the Arctic's most significant remaining boundary dispute. Oslo and Moscow had previously contested 51,300 square nautical miles of the Barents Sea, with Oslo arguing that the boundary should be an equidistance line, and Moscow claiming that its security interests and substantial Arctic population justified a line that tracked straight north from the land border. The two countries have now agreed to split the difference, dividing the disputed seabed in half.11 The agreement is a model for bilateral cooperation. As in the 1990 Bering Sea treaty, the two parties have created a "special area" to maximize the combined extent of their sovereign rights. Foreseeing that some hydrocarbons might straddle the boundary, they have promised to co-manage those resources wherever such deposits are found. They have also agreed to continue their decades-long practice of co-managing the fisheries within the previously contested area, as well as in an area of high seas that is fully enclosed by their surrounding exclusive economic zones REMAINING SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES Hans Island In the entire circumpolar Arctic, the only dispute over land territory concerns Hans Island: a 0.5 square mile rock between northwest Greenland and Ellesmere Island. It was only in 1973, when Danish and Canadian diplomats were negotiating a 1,450 nautical-mile continental shelf boundary, that they became aware of a difference of opinion concerning title over Hans Island. Instead of delaying the talks, the negotiators drew the boundary line up to the low-water mark on one side of the island and continued it from the low-water mark on the other. The insignificance of the dispute is reflected in the good humor with which both sides approach the matter. As Peter Taksoe-Jensen, the former legal adviser at the Danish Foreign Ministry, has said: "When Danish military go there, they leave a bottle of schnapps. And when [Canadian] military forces come there, they leave a bottle of Canadian Club and a sign saying, 'Welcome to Canada.'"12 In 2005, Canada and Denmark initiated negotiations.13 An agreement may now be imminent, with one possible outcome being the division of Hans Island exactly in half. Lincoln Sea The negotiators who delimited the boundary between Canada and Greenland in 1973 stopped when they reached the point where Nares Strait opens into the Arctic Ocean, which at that point is called the Lincoln Sea. As a result, the boundary out to 200 nautical miles offshore (the "continental shelf" and, later, Exclusive Economic Zone) was left unresolved. In 1977, Canada claimed a 200 nautical-mile wide fisheries zone along its Arctic Ocean coastline. The zone was bounded in the east by a Lincoln Sea boundary that was based on the equidistance principle, using the low-water line of the coasts and several fringing islands as reference marks. Denmark drew its own line three years later but, unlike Canada, relied on Beaumont Island as a reference point. Using that 3.8 square mile island off the Greenland coast pushes the equidistance line slightly westward, adding two isolated, lens-shaped areas of 31 and 34 square nautical miles to the Greenland side. The Lincoln Sea dispute is of little significance. It has no implications for the delimitation of Canada and Denmark's extended continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles, because the two contested lens-shaped areas are less than that distance from shore. The dispute is currently being negotiated, with one option being to divide the two lens-shaped areas in half. Beaufort Sea In the entire circumpolar Arctic, the only remaining boundary dispute of any significance is in the Beaufort Sea. There, Canada and the U.S. both assert ownership of 6,250 square nautical miles of seabed within 200 nautical miles, and may soon claim even more beyond 200 nautical miles. The dispute revolves around differing interpretations of a 1825 treaty which sets the border between Alaska and the Yukon at the "meridian line of the 141st degree, in its prolongation as far as the frozen ocean."14 Canada interprets this provision to mean that the maritime boundary, like the land border, must follow the 141° W. meridian straight north. The United States holds that "as far as the frozen ocean" means the boundary follows the meridian only as far as the coast. Offshore, Washington argues that, in the absence of a controlling treaty provision, customary international law requires that the equidistance principle be applied. Since the coast of Alaska, the Yukon, and the Northwest Territories slants east-southeast from Point Barrow, Alaska, to the mouth of the Mackenzie River, an equidistance line would give more of the ocean and seabed to the United States. The Beaufort Sea dispute has recently grown to include a large section of ocean floor more than 200 nautical miles from shore. According to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal states may claim rights over an "extended continental shelf" - if the depth and shape of the seabed and the thickness of underlying sediments indicate a "natural prolongation" of the shelf closer inshore.15 When the longstanding U.S. and Canadian arguments on the Beaufort Sea boundary are applied to the area beyond 200 miles, they produce a surprising result.16 Predictably, the Canadian meridian-based line extends straight to the North Pole. The U.S. line, for its part, extends outwards in a north-northeastward direction from the coast for slightly more than 200 miles, creating the traditional triangular area of dispute. But then, the equidistance line turns sharply to the west—due to the presence of Banks Island, a large chunk of Canadian territory that frames the eastern edge of the Beaufort Sea. The line cuts back across the 141st meridian and continues towards the Russia-Alaska maritime boundary, which follows the 168º58'37" W. meridian north from the Bering Strait. As a result, Canada and the United States now have to deal with two triangular areas of dispute: the pre-existing, southward pointing wedge within 200 miles from shore; and a new and possibly larger triangle beyond 200 miles. Scientific data collected recently by a pair of Canadian and U.S. icebreakers suggest that the continental shelf in this area may extend 350 or more nautical miles from shore. And since the two triangles are on opposite sides of the 141st meridian, the longstanding U.S. argument now potentially benefits Canada, while the longstanding Canadian argument potentially benefits the United States. The opportunity for a negotiated outcome is suddenly present, which explains why negotiations began in 2010. Northwest Passage As the sea-ice melts, shipping through Arctic waters is increasing dramatically. The Northwest Passage offers a 4,000 nautical mile short cut between East Asia and the Atlantic Seaboard, as compared with the route through the Panama Canal. The status of the Passage is disputed between Canada and the United States, with the former regarding it as Canadian internal waters, and the latter considering it an 'international strait." In 1988, the two countries concluded a cooperation agreement whereby they dealt with the issue of transits by U.S. Coastguard icebreakers by agreeing that Washington would always seek permission from Ottawa, and that permission would always be granted. Soon, however, melting sea-ice and increased foreign shipping will necessitate a new agreement, which complimentary security and environmental concerns should make it possible to achieve. Access to the Northwest Passage is not at issue, since Canada would never deny entry to a close ally. Nor would recognizing Canada's claim necessarily create a damaging precedent—as the U.S. Navy fears—since sea-ice and the resulting infrequency of navigation have created a situation where the Northwest Passage is legally distinguishable from the other waterways the United States insists are international straits. In the 21st century, when Washington's principal security concern is terrorists and other non-state actors, it makes no sense to have foreign vessels shielded from the application of coastal state's laws as they pass though a sizable portion of North America. It was for this reason that, in 2005, then U.S. Ambassador Paul Cellucci asked the State Department to reexamine the United States' legal position concerning the Northwest Passage.18 After his term in Ottawa was over, Cellucci made his personal views clear: "It is in the security interests of the United States that it [the Passage] be under the control of Canada."19 Northern Sea Route The Northern Sea Route, which runs from the Bering Strait in the east to Novaya Zemlya in the west, offers a 40 percent reduction in the sailing distance between Northeast Asia and Europe. With the sea-ice along the Russian coast receding faster than anywhere else in the Arctic, commercial transits have already become an attractive proposition. Some 150,000 tons of oil, 400,000 tons of gas condensate and 600,000 tons of iron ore will be shipped through in 2011. As with the Northwest Passage, only the coastal state and the United States have explicitly taken positions on the legal status of the waterway. Russia claims that the choke points between its mainland and the islands of Novaya Zemlya, Diksonskiy and Bol Lykahvskiy constitute internal waters; the United States says they are international straits. But Russia, with its still-powerful military, has no worries about foreign ships physically challenging its claim. FUTURE SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES? Central Arctic Ocean No country will ever "own" the geographic North Pole, which is located roughly 400 nautical miles to the north of Greenland, Canada's Ellesmere Island, and Russia's Franz Josef Land. Under the law of the sea each coastal state automatically has a 12-nautical mile territorial sea as well as an "exclusive economic zone" (EEZ) from 12 to 200 nautical miles offshore where, as the name suggests, it holds exclusive rights over the natural resources of the water column, ocean floor, and seabed. Beyond 200 nautical miles, coastal states may claim rights over an "extended continental shelf," but only if the depth and shape of the seabed and the thickness of underlying sediments indicate a "natural prolongation" of the shelf closer inshore.20 Parties to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea are supposed to submit their claims and supporting scientific evidence within ten years of ratification. The submissions are considered by the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, which is made up of scientists elected by the ratifying states. Instead of responding with binding decisions, the Commission makes recommendations that, because they are based on geographic and geological facts, are treated as having considerable weight. On the basis of what little we know about the Arctic Ocean so far, it is possible that either Russia, Denmark, or Canada will be able to scientifically demonstrate that the seabed at the North Pole is a natural prolongation of its continental shelf. If so, the country in question will have the exclusive right to exploit the resources of that area of seabed and nothing more. The water and sea ice will remain part of the high seas. The same is true everywhere else that countries are determined to have extended continental shelves, and given the sheer size of the Arctic Ocean and the lengths of uncontested coastlines, these areas will be extensive. Russia will likely have rights over an expanse of seabed larger than Western Europe. Canada, with the world's longest coastline, will also have a massive extended continental shelf, as will the United States north of Alaska. Countries that do not border on the Arctic Ocean might feel left out, but because the law of the sea applies globally, many have the opportunity to assert similar rights along their coastlines. Apart from the technical exercise of collecting and assessing the scientific evidence, the only significant issue concerning extended continental shelves involves possible overlaps between claims. An overlap can occur where there is a disputed maritime boundary closer inshore, since the dividing line beyond 200 nautical miles is usually simply an extension from the starting point. The Beaufort Sea is the only place in the Arctic where such a situation might pertain today, and boundary negotiations there are already underway. An overlap could also occur in the central Arctic Ocean, but because Canada, Russia, and Denmark have not yet completed their mapping, nobody knows whether such an overlap—and therefore a dispute—exists. The UN Commission will not make recommendations with regard to overlapping claims. It is up to the countries involved to negotiate a solution, refer the matter to an international court or tribunal, or simply agree to disagree and not issue oil and gas exploration licenses. It is also possible for countries to facilitate the work of the Commission, either by giving it permission to issue recommendations with respect to a disputed area, or by making a joint or coordinated submission. Canadian and Russian diplomats have discussed these possibilities during at least two meetings. OTHER ISSUES Search and Rescue The signing of a multilateral search-and-rescue treaty at an Arctic Council meeting in May 2011 confirms that cooperation, not conflict, has become the dominant paradigm in the North. The treaty was needed because hundreds of cruise ships and thousands of commercial airliners traverse the Arctic each year, making a major accident inevitable in that vast, inhospitable, and sparsely populated region. Although the treaty only requires Arctic countries to "promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue capability" in their geographic area of responsibility, it clarifies procedures for sharing information and assets—so that equipment and personnel can be deployed more quickly and effectively. And since many of those assets will be military in character, the treaty will build trust and reduce tensions between the armed forces of the various Arctic states. High Seas Shipping and Fishing Fishing has been limited in the Arctic Ocean by an absence of commercially attractive species and the near-constant presence of sea-ice. But now, with the ocean warming and the ice melting, Pacific Sockeye Salmon, Atlantic Cod, and other species are moving north. Within 200 nautical miles from shore, jurisdiction to regulate fishing falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the coastal state. But stocks that live in the high seas beyond the EEZ, or move between the high seas and the EEZ or between the EEZs of adjoining states, can only be protected adequately through international cooperation. A fisheries agreement will eventually be needed for the international waters in the central Arctic Ocean, with the most likely course being the creation of a regional fisheries organization within the framework of the 1995 UN Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. In the meantime, the United States has imposed a moratorium on commercial fishing within its Arctic waters, and other countries are being urged to follow suit. Trans-Boundary Pollution Arctic offshore drilling has only ever involved a few exploratory wells, and as a result, governments have never adopted regulations specifically designed for the considerable risks presented by such a remote and inhospitable region. Two factors have caused this situation to change: a recent rise in world oil prices; and the April 2010 blowout of a BP rig 41 miles off the Louisiana coast, which resulted in a spill of between three-eight million barrels. Arctic offshore drilling carries important transnational implications because some of the activity will occur close to international maritime boundaries in the Davis Strait between Greenland and Canada, in the Beaufort Sea north of Alaska and the Yukon, and in the Beaufort Sea north of Russia and Norway. In 1997, the Arctic Council adopted a set of "Arctic offshore oil and gas guidelines," which it updated in 2002 and again in 2009.21 The guidelines include some general principles as well as a number of more detailed recommendations. But in addition to being non-binding, the guidelines deliberately avoid some of the more contentious issues—such as whether operators should be required to maintain the capacity to sink a relief well during the same drilling season, by stationing another rig close-by. In May 2011, the Arctic Council initiated a negotiating process for a treaty on oil spill response and clean-up.22 Although this step towards greater cooperation is laudable, an oil spill prevention treaty is also needed; one that builds on the Arctic Council's guidelines by addressing, not just the easier challenges, but also some of the more difficult ones. Non-State Security Threats Twenty years after the Cold War, the threat of interstate conflict in the Arctic is dramatically reduced. Russia is a member of the G20, the Arctic Council, and a soon-to-be member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Its largest trading partner is the European Union, which is made up mostly of NATO states. In 2010, Russian military spending was just a small fraction of that of the United States ($ 58.7 billion USD versus $ 698 billion USD).23 China likewise does not pose a military threat, especially in the Arctic which is remote from its shores. The world's largest trading nation, China, is a member of the WTO. It has also ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and is using the same provision of that treaty as Arctic countries—in its case, to assert sovereign rights over an extended continental shelf in the East China Sea. And while China's military budget is growing, in 2010 it was just $119 billion USD, less than one fifth of U.S. expenditures, and less than that of France and Germany combined.24 These assessments about Arctic security are shared by NATO leaders. In May 2010, Admiral Gary Roughead, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, issued a memorandum on "Naval Strategic Objectives for the Arctic" that stated "the potential for conflict in the Arctic is low."25 "The Arctic is a peaceful region where any issues that arise can be resolved in accordance with international law,"26 said Prime Minister Stoltenberg of Norway later that summer. And in August 2010, the Government of Canada's Statement on Arctic Foreign Policy said: "Canada does not anticipate any military challenges in the Arctic and believes that the region is well managed through existing institutions, particularly the Arctic Council."27 Instead, the Arctic security threats that exist concern non-state actors, such as drug smugglers, gunrunners, illegal immigrants, and even terrorists, who might take advantage of ice-free Arctic waters to move contraband or people between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans or into North America or Europe. These threats from non-state actors were recognized by former U.S. Ambassador to Canada Paul Cellucci who, in August 2007, said: "I think, in the age of terrorism, it's in our security interests that the Northwest Passage be considered part of Canada. That would enable the Canadian navy to intercept and board vessels in the Northwest Passage to make sure they're not trying to bring weapons of mass destruction into North America."28 Although the Northwest Passage dispute has not yet been resolved, cooperation on non-state threats is moving forward quickly. For example, in May 2006, the North American Aerospace Defense Command agreement was renewed and expanded to include the sharing of surveillance over maritime approaches and "internal waterways" between Canada and the United States—including the Northwest Passage. More recently, in August 2010, military personnel from the United States, Russia, and Canada participated in a joint exercise designed to test their response to the hijacking of a commercial jet in international airspace, in this case over the Bering Sea. Conclusion Climate change has thrust the Arctic into the center of international relations, where it will likely now stay. This rapid repositioning of the region has caught politicians, journalists, and scholars unprepared and ill-equipped to analyze and explain what is happening. As a result, too much emphasis has been placed on the remote possibility of inter-state conflict, and not enough on the strong trend towards cooperation that is actually taking place. In the early 21st century, the security threats in the Arctic concern non-state actors, and all northern governments—including Russia—are working together to counter and contain them.

Multiple checks on conflict

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Tensions over resources are yet to multiply risk in the way some observers expect. Resources have the greatest potential to drive conflict when they lie in contested territory. However, overlaying a map of undiscovered energy with a map of territorial disputes reveals that the vast majority of undiscovered reserves (85-90% as a rough estimate) are in the non-disputed EEZs of Arctic nations. This creates an important check on aggressive behavior. 67 Uncertainty about the economic viability of Arctic reserves has also played a moderating role, given technical obstacles and the high risk premium of any investment in exploitation, and the incentives for states to collaborate given the financial and technological obstacles to operating in the region. Indeed, Russia’s heightened interest can be explained, in part, by the fact that, alone among the five Arctic coastal states, its investment decisions are primarily state rather than market-controlled. A similar dynamic is at play for transshipment. Over the next twenty years, and however fast the ice melts, Arctic navigation will continue to be seasonal, hazardous, and unpredictable— all factors that mitigate the benefits of faster routes to Asian markets. As a result, initial excitement about Arctic navigation is giving way to a more sober assessment of the commercial opportunities that the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route will provide. In conclusion, it is clear that the geography of risk is shifting rapidly due to climate change, with the loss of ice proceeding more rapidly than many had predicted. Each Arctic state has had to react to these changes and to the uncertainty about how other states will react to new opportunities and threats in the region. Much popular analysis, however, neglects factors that are slowing transformation in the Arctic (the expense and riskiness of resource extraction and navigation) or making it easier to manage (the relatively small resource endowment that lies in contested territory). The Arctic’s commercial potential is still heavily discounted— in other words, providing time for states to resolve strategic challenges. As a result, they have become more willing to explore what help, if any, the multilateral arena can provide.

No solvency – the military isn’t prepared for Arctic deterrence

Goldenberg, 11 (Suzanne, “Prepare for Arctic struggle as climate changes, US navy warned,” The Guardian, 3/10/11, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/mar/10/arctic-struggle-climate-change)Red

America urgently needs to build up its military readiness in the Arctic where melting summer sea ice is setting up a global struggle for resources, a study prepared for the US navy has warned. The report by the National Academy of Sciences warned that climate change could upset the delicate security balance in the Arctic – even among close allies – and that America is unprepared for the challenges ahead. "The US military as a whole has lost most of its competence in cold-weather operations for Arctic weather," the report, National Security Implications of Climate Change for US Naval Forces, warned. "In the immediate term, the navy should begin Arctic training and the marine corps should also establish a cold weather training programme." The report warned that America was currently unprepared to defend its interests in the Arctic. Current submarine sytems would be challenged to operate in the Arctic, the report warned. In addition, the coastguard has just three ice breakers, and these are old and obsolete. It went on to call on the navy to develop an Arctic observer and research service, with remote sensing equipment such as satellites and drones. "Even the most moderate predicted trends in climate change will present new national security challenges for the US navy, marine corps, and coastguard," said Frank Bowman, a retired US navy admiral and co-chair of the committee that produced the report. "Naval forces need to monitor more closely and start preparing now for projected challenges climate change will present in the future," Bowman said.

No arctic conflict

Dyer 12 (Gwynne Dyer, OC is a London-based independent Canadian journalist, syndicated columnist and military historian., His articles are published in 45 countries, 8/4/2012, "Race for Arctic Mostly Rhetoric", www.winnipegfreepress.com/opinion/columnists/race-for-arctic-mostly-rhetoric-164986566.html)

Russian television contacted me last night asking me to go on a program about the race for Arctic resources. The ice is melting fast, and it was all the usual stuff about how there will be big strategic conflicts over the seabed resources -- especially oil and gas -- that become accessible when it's gone. The media always love conflict, and now that the Cold War is long gone, there's no other potential military confrontation between the great powers to worry about. Governments around the Arctic Ocean are beefing up their armed forces for the coming struggle, so where are the flashpoints and what are the strategies? It's great fun to speculate about possible wars. In the end I didn't do the interview because the Skype didn't work, so I didn't get the chance to rain on their parade. But here's what I would said to the Russians if my server hadn't gone down at the wrong time. First, you should never ask the barber if you need a haircut. The armed forces in every country are always looking for reasons to worry about impending conflict, because that's the only reason their governments will spend money on them. Sometimes they will be right to worry, and sometimes they will be wrong, but right or wrong, they will predict conflict. Like the barbers, it's in their professional interest to say you need their services. So you'd be better off to ask somebody who doesn't have a stake in the game. As I don't own a single warship, I'm practically ideal for the job. And I don't think there will be any significant role for the armed forces in the Arctic, although there is certainly going to be a huge investment in exploiting the region's resources. There are three separate "resources" in the Arctic. On the surface, there are the sea lanes that are opening up to commercial traffic along the northern coasts of Russia and Canada. Under the seabed, there are potential oil and gas deposits that can be drilled once the ice retreats. And in the water in between, there is the planet's last unfished ocean. The sea lanes are mainly a Canadian obsession, because the government believes the Northwest Passage that weaves between Canada's Arctic islands will become a major commercial artery when the ice is gone. Practically every summer, Prime Minister Stephen Harper travels north to declare his determination to defend Canada's Arctic sovereignty from -- well, it's not clear from exactly whom, but it's a great photo op. Canada is getting new Arctic patrol vessels and building a deep-water naval port and Arctic warfare training centre in the region, but it's all much ado about nothing. The Arctic Ocean will increasingly be used as a shortcut between the North Atlantic and the North Pacific, but the shipping will not go through Canadian waters. Russia's "Northern Sea Route" will get the traffic, because it's already open and much safer to navigate. Then there's the hydrocarbon deposits under the Arctic seabed, which the U.S. Geological Survey has forecast may contain almost one-fourth of the world's remaining oil and gas resources. But from a military point of view, there's only a problem if there is some disagreement about the seabed boundaries. There are only four areas where the boundaries are disputed. Two are between Canada and its eastern and western neighbours in Alaska and Greenland, but there is zero likelihood of a war between Canada and the United States or Denmark (which is responsible for Greenland's defence). In the Bering Strait, there is a treaty defining the seabed boundary between the United States and Russia, signed in the dying days of the Soviet Union, but the Russian Duma has refused to ratify it. The legal uncertainty caused by the dispute, however, is more likely to deter future investment in drilling there than lead to war. And then there was the seabed-boundary dispute between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea, which led Norway to double the size of its navy over the past decade. But last year, the two countries signed an agreement dividing the disputed area right down the middle and providing for joint exploitation of its resources. So no war between NATO (of which Norway is a member) and the Russian Federation. Which leaves the fish, and it's hard to have a war over fish. The danger is rather that the world's fishing fleets will crowd in and clean the fish out, as they are currently doing in the Southern Ocean around Antarctica. If the countries with Arctic coastlines want to preserve this resource, they can only do so by creating an international body to regulate the fishing. And they will have to let other countries fish there, too, with agreed catch limits, since they are mostly international waters. They will be driven to co-operate, in their own interests. So no war over the Arctic. All we have to worry about now is the fact the ice is melting, which will speed global warming (because open water absorbs far more heat from the sun than highly reflective ice), and ultimately melt the Greenland icecap and raise sea levels worldwide by seven metres. But that's a problem for another day.

Arctic conflict is impossible – cooperation solves

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INTRODUCTION Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union squared off on opposite sides of the Arctic Ocean. Nuclear submarines prowled the depths, while long-range bombers circled overhead. A more cooperative approach emerged after 1990, with Moscow and Washington negotiating a boundary in the Bering Strait, Bering Sea, and Chukchi Sea that year. In 1996, the eight Arctic countries—Russia, United States, Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland—created the Arctic Council to provide an inter-governmental forum for the discussion of nonmilitary issues. On the security front, the Russian government allowed Soviet-era warships to rust-out, while the U.S. and Canadian governments chose not to replace aging ice-breakers. More recently, climate change and rising oil prices have given rise to concerns about possible struggles for territory and resources. In August 2007, Artur Chilingarov, the deputy speaker of the Russian Duma, caused a media frenzy by planting a titanium flag on the seabed at the North Pole and declaring "the Arctic is Russian."1 Canadian foreign minister Peter MacKay responded: "Look, this isn't the fifteenth century. You can't go around the world and just plant flags and say, 'We're claiming this territory.' Our claims over our Arctic are very well established."2 In October 2008, the European Parliament stirred things up further by calling for a new multilateral convention modeled on the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.3 In doing so, it was implicitly questioning the extensive rights of Arctic Ocean coastal states under the law of the sea. That same year, Scott Borgerson wrote: "The combination of new shipping routes, trillions of dollars in possible oil and gas resources, and a poorly defined picture of state ownership makes for a toxic brew."4 Cooler heads have since prevailed. One of the Russian scientists involved in the North Pole flag plant admitted that it was a publicity stunt lacking in legal relevance. Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig invited his counterparts from the other four Arctic Ocean coastal states (Canada, Norway, Russia, and the U.S.) to Ilulissat, Greenland, where they reaffirmed their commitment to resolving disputes within an existing framework of international law.5 The European Union issued an Arctic policy that recognized the primacy of the law of the sea in a region which, unlike the Antarctic, is centered on an ocean.6 U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke of the need for Arctic countries to work together: "We need all hands on deck because there is a huge amount to do, and not much time to do it."7 And in May 2011, the Arctic countries signed a multilateral search-and-rescue treaty, the first legal instrument negotiated within the framework of the Arctic Council.8 They also created a permanent secretariat for the Council, thus transforming it from an inter-governmental forum into a fully-fledged international organization. As the following review will demonstrate, all this cooperation is made easier by the fact that most Arctic sovereignty disputes have either been resolved or are actively being negotiated. In short, there is no competition for territory or resources in the Arctic, and no prospect of conflict either. RESOLVED SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES 1973 Canada-Denmark Boundary Treaty In 1973, Canada and Denmark agreed to divide the ocean floor between Canada and Greenland using an equidistance line, i.e. a line which at every point is an equal distance from each of the two opposing coasts. Since then, they have also used the resulting 1450 nautical mile boundary to define their fishing zones, meaning that the continental shelf delimitation has informally become an all-purpose maritime boundary. 1990 Bering Sea Treaty There is no sovereignty dispute between Russia and the United States because Moscow and Washington negotiated a 1390 nautical mile all-purpose maritime boundary in 1990.9 The treaty contains some important innovations, including the use of so-called "special areas"—whereby sovereign rights generated as the result of proximity to one treaty partner's coastline, but cut-off from that coastline by the newly agreed boundary, are transferred to the other treaty partner so as to maximize their combined areas of national jurisdiction. Although the treaty was never ratified by the Russian Duma, it is fully respected in practice and could, eventually, become binding by prescription. 2006 Denmark-Norway Boundary Treaty In 2006, Denmark and Norway negotiated an all-purpose maritime boundary between Greenland and the Norwegian Arctic archipelago of Svalbard.10 Roughly 430 nautical miles long, the boundary is based on the equidistance principle. 2010 Barents Sea Treaty In 2010, Norway and Russia settled the Arctic's most significant remaining boundary dispute. Oslo and Moscow had previously contested 51,300 square nautical miles of the Barents Sea, with Oslo arguing that the boundary should be an equidistance line, and Moscow claiming that its security interests and substantial Arctic population justified a line that tracked straight north from the land border. The two countries have now agreed to split the difference, dividing the disputed seabed in half.11 The agreement is a model for bilateral cooperation. As in the 1990 Bering Sea treaty, the two parties have created a "special area" to maximize the combined extent of their sovereign rights. Foreseeing that some hydrocarbons might straddle the boundary, they have promised to co-manage those resources wherever such deposits are found. They have also agreed to continue their decades-long practice of co-managing the fisheries within the previously contested area, as well as in an area of high seas that is fully enclosed by their surrounding exclusive economic zones REMAINING SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES Hans Island In the entire circumpolar Arctic, the only dispute over land territory concerns Hans Island: a 0.5 square mile rock between northwest Greenland and Ellesmere Island. It was only in 1973, when Danish and Canadian diplomats were negotiating a 1,450 nautical-mile continental shelf boundary, that they became aware of a difference of opinion concerning title over Hans Island. Instead of delaying the talks, the negotiators drew the boundary line up to the low-water mark on one side of the island and continued it from the low-water mark on the other. The insignificance of the dispute is reflected in the good humor with which both sides approach the matter. As Peter Taksoe-Jensen, the former legal adviser at the Danish Foreign Ministry, has said: "When Danish military go there, they leave a bottle of schnapps. And when [Canadian] military forces come there, they leave a bottle of Canadian Club and a sign saying, 'Welcome to Canada.'"12 In 2005, Canada and Denmark initiated negotiations.13 An agreement may now be imminent, with one possible outcome being the division of Hans Island exactly in half. Lincoln Sea The negotiators who delimited the boundary between Canada and Greenland in 1973 stopped when they reached the point where Nares Strait opens into the Arctic Ocean, which at that point is called the Lincoln Sea. As a result, the boundary out to 200 nautical miles offshore (the "continental shelf" and, later, Exclusive Economic Zone) was left unresolved. In 1977, Canada claimed a 200 nautical-mile wide fisheries zone along its Arctic Ocean coastline. The zone was bounded in the east by a Lincoln Sea boundary that was based on the equidistance principle, using the low-water line of the coasts and several fringing islands as reference marks. Denmark drew its own line three years later but, unlike Canada, relied on Beaumont Island as a reference point. Using that 3.8 square mile island off the Greenland coast pushes the equidistance line slightly westward, adding two isolated, lens-shaped areas of 31 and 34 square nautical miles to the Greenland side. The Lincoln Sea dispute is of little significance. It has no implications for the delimitation of Canada and Denmark's extended continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles, because the two contested lens-shaped areas are less than that distance from shore. The dispute is currently being negotiated, with one option being to divide the two lens-shaped areas in half. Beaufort Sea In the entire circumpolar Arctic, the only remaining boundary dispute of any significance is in the Beaufort Sea. There, Canada and the U.S. both assert ownership of 6,250 square nautical miles of seabed within 200 nautical miles, and may soon claim even more beyond 200 nautical miles. The dispute revolves around differing interpretations of a 1825 treaty which sets the border between Alaska and the Yukon at the "meridian line of the 141st degree, in its prolongation as far as the frozen ocean."14 Canada interprets this provision to mean that the maritime boundary, like the land border, must follow the 141° W. meridian straight north. The United States holds that "as far as the frozen ocean" means the boundary follows the meridian only as far as the coast. Offshore, Washington argues that, in the absence of a controlling treaty provision, customary international law requires that the equidistance principle be applied. Since the coast of Alaska, the Yukon, and the Northwest Territories slants east-southeast from Point Barrow, Alaska, to the mouth of the Mackenzie River, an equidistance line would give more of the ocean and seabed to the United States. The Beaufort Sea dispute has recently grown to include a large section of ocean floor more than 200 nautical miles from shore. According to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal states may claim rights over an "extended continental shelf" - if the depth and shape of the seabed and the thickness of underlying sediments indicate a "natural prolongation" of the shelf closer inshore.15 When the longstanding U.S. and Canadian arguments on the Beaufort Sea boundary are applied to the area beyond 200 miles, they produce a surprising result.16 Predictably, the Canadian meridian-based line extends straight to the North Pole. The U.S. line, for its part, extends outwards in a north-northeastward direction from the coast for slightly more than 200 miles, creating the traditional triangular area of dispute. But then, the equidistance line turns sharply to the west—due to the presence of Banks Island, a large chunk of Canadian territory that frames the eastern edge of the Beaufort Sea. The line cuts back across the 141st meridian and continues towards the Russia-Alaska maritime boundary, which follows the 168º58'37" W. meridian north from the Bering Strait. As a result, Canada and the United States now have to deal with two triangular areas of dispute: the pre-existing, southward pointing wedge within 200 miles from shore; and a new and possibly larger triangle beyond 200 miles. Scientific data collected recently by a pair of Canadian and U.S. icebreakers suggest that the continental shelf in this area may extend 350 or more nautical miles from shore. And since the two triangles are on opposite sides of the 141st meridian, the longstanding U.S. argument now potentially benefits Canada, while the longstanding Canadian argument potentially benefits the United States. The opportunity for a negotiated outcome is suddenly present, which explains why negotiations began in 2010. Northwest Passage As the sea-ice melts, shipping through Arctic waters is increasing dramatically. The Northwest Passage offers a 4,000 nautical mile short cut between East Asia and the Atlantic Seaboard, as compared with the route through the Panama Canal. The status of the Passage is disputed between Canada and the United States, with the former regarding it as Canadian internal waters, and the latter considering it an 'international strait." In 1988, the two countries concluded a cooperation agreement whereby they dealt with the issue of transits by U.S. Coastguard icebreakers by agreeing that Washington would always seek permission from Ottawa, and that permission would always be granted. Soon, however, melting sea-ice and increased foreign shipping will necessitate a new agreement, which complimentary security and environmental concerns should make it possible to achieve. Access to the Northwest Passage is not at issue, since Canada would never deny entry to a close ally. Nor would recognizing Canada's claim necessarily create a damaging precedent—as the U.S. Navy fears—since sea-ice and the resulting infrequency of navigation have created a situation where the Northwest Passage is legally distinguishable from the other waterways the United States insists are international straits. In the 21st century, when Washington's principal security concern is terrorists and other non-state actors, it makes no sense to have foreign vessels shielded from the application of coastal state's laws as they pass though a sizable portion of North America. It was for this reason that, in 2005, then U.S. Ambassador Paul Cellucci asked the State Department to reexamine the United States' legal position concerning the Northwest Passage.18 After his term in Ottawa was over, Cellucci made his personal views clear: "It is in the security interests of the United States that it [the Passage] be under the control of Canada."19 Northern Sea Route The Northern Sea Route, which runs from the Bering Strait in the east to Novaya Zemlya in the west, offers a 40 percent reduction in the sailing distance between Northeast Asia and Europe. With the sea-ice along the Russian coast receding faster than anywhere else in the Arctic, commercial transits have already become an attractive proposition. Some 150,000 tons of oil, 400,000 tons of gas condensate and 600,000 tons of iron ore will be shipped through in 2011. As with the Northwest Passage, only the coastal state and the United States have explicitly taken positions on the legal status of the waterway. Russia claims that the choke points between its mainland and the islands of Novaya Zemlya, Diksonskiy and Bol Lykahvskiy constitute internal waters; the United States says they are international straits. But Russia, with its still-powerful military, has no worries about foreign ships physically challenging its claim. FUTURE SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES? Central Arctic Ocean No country will ever "own" the geographic North Pole, which is located roughly 400 nautical miles to the north of Greenland, Canada's Ellesmere Island, and Russia's Franz Josef Land. Under the law of the sea each coastal state automatically has a 12-nautical mile territorial sea as well as an "exclusive economic zone" (EEZ) from 12 to 200 nautical miles offshore where, as the name suggests, it holds exclusive rights over the natural resources of the water column, ocean floor, and seabed. Beyond 200 nautical miles, coastal states may claim rights over an "extended continental shelf," but only if the depth and shape of the seabed and the thickness of underlying sediments indicate a "natural prolongation" of the shelf closer inshore.20 Parties to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea are supposed to submit their claims and supporting scientific evidence within ten years of ratification. The submissions are considered by the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, which is made up of scientists elected by the ratifying states. Instead of responding with binding decisions, the Commission makes recommendations that, because they are based on geographic and geological facts, are treated as having considerable weight. On the basis of what little we know about the Arctic Ocean so far, it is possible that either Russia, Denmark, or Canada will be able to scientifically demonstrate that the seabed at the North Pole is a natural prolongation of its continental shelf. If so, the country in question will have the exclusive right to exploit the resources of that area of seabed and nothing more. The water and sea ice will remain part of the high seas. The same is true everywhere else that countries are determined to have extended continental shelves, and given the sheer size of the Arctic Ocean and the lengths of uncontested coastlines, these areas will be extensive. Russia will likely have rights over an expanse of seabed larger than Western Europe. Canada, with the world's longest coastline, will also have a massive extended continental shelf, as will the United States north of Alaska. Countries that do not border on the Arctic Ocean might feel left out, but because the law of the sea applies globally, many have the opportunity to assert similar rights along their coastlines. Apart from the technical exercise of collecting and assessing the scientific evidence, the only significant issue concerning extended continental shelves involves possible overlaps between claims. An overlap can occur where there is a disputed maritime boundary closer inshore, since the dividing line beyond 200 nautical miles is usually simply an extension from the starting point. The Beaufort Sea is the only place in the Arctic where such a situation might pertain today, and boundary negotiations there are already underway. An overlap could also occur in the central Arctic Ocean, but because Canada, Russia, and Denmark have not yet completed their mapping, nobody knows whether such an overlap—and therefore a dispute—exists. The UN Commission will not make recommendations with regard to overlapping claims. It is up to the countries involved to negotiate a solution, refer the matter to an international court or tribunal, or simply agree to disagree and not issue oil and gas exploration licenses. It is also possible for countries to facilitate the work of the Commission, either by giving it permission to issue recommendations with respect to a disputed area, or by making a joint or coordinated submission. Canadian and Russian diplomats have discussed these possibilities during at least two meetings. OTHER ISSUES Search and Rescue The signing of a multilateral search-and-rescue treaty at an Arctic Council meeting in May 2011 confirms that cooperation, not conflict, has become the dominant paradigm in the North. The treaty was needed because hundreds of cruise ships and thousands of commercial airliners traverse the Arctic each year, making a major accident inevitable in that vast, inhospitable, and sparsely populated region. Although the treaty only requires Arctic countries to "promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue capability" in their geographic area of responsibility, it clarifies procedures for sharing information and assets—so that equipment and personnel can be deployed more quickly and effectively. And since many of those assets will be military in character, the treaty will build trust and reduce tensions between the armed forces of the various Arctic states. High Seas Shipping and Fishing Fishing has been limited in the Arctic Ocean by an absence of commercially attractive species and the near-constant presence of sea-ice. But now, with the ocean warming and the ice melting, Pacific Sockeye Salmon, Atlantic Cod, and other species are moving north. Within 200 nautical miles from shore, jurisdiction to regulate fishing falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the coastal state. But stocks that live in the high seas beyond the EEZ, or move between the high seas and the EEZ or between the EEZs of adjoining states, can only be protected adequately through international cooperation. A fisheries agreement will eventually be needed for the international waters in the central Arctic Ocean, with the most likely course being the creation of a regional fisheries organization within the framework of the 1995 UN Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. In the meantime, the United States has imposed a moratorium on commercial fishing within its Arctic waters, and other countries are being urged to follow suit. Trans-Boundary Pollution Arctic offshore drilling has only ever involved a few exploratory wells, and as a result, governments have never adopted regulations specifically designed for the considerable risks presented by such a remote and inhospitable region. Two factors have caused this situation to change: a recent rise in world oil prices; and the April 2010 blowout of a BP rig 41 miles off the Louisiana coast, which resulted in a spill of between three-eight million barrels. Arctic offshore drilling carries important transnational implications because some of the activity will occur close to international maritime boundaries in the Davis Strait between Greenland and Canada, in the Beaufort Sea north of Alaska and the Yukon, and in the Beaufort Sea north of Russia and Norway. In 1997, the Arctic Council adopted a set of "Arctic offshore oil and gas guidelines," which it updated in 2002 and again in 2009.21 The guidelines include some general principles as well as a number of more detailed recommendations. But in addition to being non-binding, the guidelines deliberately avoid some of the more contentious issues—such as whether operators should be required to maintain the capacity to sink a relief well during the same drilling season, by stationing another rig close-by. In May 2011, the Arctic Council initiated a negotiating process for a treaty on oil spill response and clean-up.22 Although this step towards greater cooperation is laudable, an oil spill prevention treaty is also needed; one that builds on the Arctic Council's guidelines by addressing, not just the easier challenges, but also some of the more difficult ones. Non-State Security Threats Twenty years after the Cold War, the threat of interstate conflict in the Arctic is dramatically reduced. Russia is a member of the G20, the Arctic Council, and a soon-to-be member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Its largest trading partner is the European Union, which is made up mostly of NATO states. In 2010, Russian military spending was just a small fraction of that of the United States ($ 58.7 billion USD versus $ 698 billion USD).23 China likewise does not pose a military threat, especially in the Arctic which is remote from its shores. The world's largest trading nation, China, is a member of the WTO. It has also ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and is using the same provision of that treaty as Arctic countries—in its case, to assert sovereign rights over an extended continental shelf in the East China Sea. And while China's military budget is growing, in 2010 it was just $119 billion USD, less than one fifth of U.S. expenditures, and less than that of France and Germany combined.24 These assessments about Arctic security are shared by NATO leaders. In May 2010, Admiral Gary Roughead, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, issued a memorandum on "Naval Strategic Objectives for the Arctic" that stated "the potential for conflict in the Arctic is low."25 "The Arctic is a peaceful region where any issues that arise can be resolved in accordance with international law,"26 said Prime Minister Stoltenberg of Norway later that summer. And in August 2010, the Government of Canada's Statement on Arctic Foreign Policy said: "Canada does not anticipate any military challenges in the Arctic and believes that the region is well managed through existing institutions, particularly the Arctic Council."27 Instead, the Arctic security threats that exist concern non-state actors, such as drug smugglers, gunrunners, illegal immigrants, and even terrorists, who might take advantage of ice-free Arctic waters to move contraband or people between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans or into North America or Europe. These threats from non-state actors were recognized by former U.S. Ambassador to Canada Paul Cellucci who, in August 2007, said: "I think, in the age of terrorism, it's in our security interests that the Northwest Passage be considered part of Canada. That would enable the Canadian navy to intercept and board vessels in the Northwest Passage to make sure they're not trying to bring weapons of mass destruction into North America."28 Although the Northwest Passage dispute has not yet been resolved, cooperation on non-state threats is moving forward quickly. For example, in May 2006, the North American Aerospace Defense Command agreement was renewed and expanded to include the sharing of surveillance over maritime approaches and "internal waterways" between Canada and the United States—including the Northwest Passage. More recently, in August 2010, military personnel from the United States, Russia, and Canada participated in a joint exercise designed to test their response to the hijacking of a commercial jet in international airspace, in this case over the Bering Sea. Conclusion Climate change has thrust the Arctic into the center of international relations, where it will likely now stay. This rapid repositioning of the region has caught politicians, journalists, and scholars unprepared and ill-equipped to analyze and explain what is happening. As a result, too much emphasis has been placed on the remote possibility of inter-state conflict, and not enough on the strong trend towards cooperation that is actually taking place. In the early 21st century, the security threats in the Arctic concern non-state actors, and all northern governments—including Russia—are working together to counter and contain them.

Multiple checks on conflict

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Tensions over resources are yet to multiply risk in the way some observers expect. Resources have the greatest potential to drive conflict when they lie in contested territory. However, overlaying a map of undiscovered energy with a map of territorial disputes reveals that the vast majority of undiscovered reserves (85-90% as a rough estimate) are in the non-disputed EEZs of Arctic nations. This creates an important check on aggressive behavior. 67 Uncertainty about the economic viability of Arctic reserves has also played a moderating role, given technical obstacles and the high risk premium of any investment in exploitation, and the incentives for states to collaborate given the financial and technological obstacles to operating in the region. Indeed, Russia’s heightened interest can be explained, in part, by the fact that, alone among the five Arctic coastal states, its investment decisions are primarily state rather than market-controlled. A similar dynamic is at play for transshipment. Over the next twenty years, and however fast the ice melts, Arctic navigation will continue to be seasonal, hazardous, and unpredictable— all factors that mitigate the benefits of faster routes to Asian markets. As a result, initial excitement about Arctic navigation is giving way to a more sober assessment of the commercial opportunities that the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route will provide. In conclusion, it is clear that the geography of risk is shifting rapidly due to climate change, with the loss of ice proceeding more rapidly than many had predicted. Each Arctic state has had to react to these changes and to the uncertainty about how other states will react to new opportunities and threats in the region. Much popular analysis, however, neglects factors that are slowing transformation in the Arctic (the expense and riskiness of resource extraction and navigation) or making it easier to manage (the relatively small resource endowment that lies in contested territory). The Arctic’s commercial potential is still heavily discounted— in other words, providing time for states to resolve strategic challenges. As a result, they have become more willing to explore what help, if any, the multilateral arena can provide.

No solvency – the military isn’t prepared for Arctic deterrence

Goldenberg, 11 (Suzanne, “Prepare for Arctic struggle as climate changes, US navy warned,” The Guardian, 3/10/11, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/mar/10/arctic-struggle-climate-change)Red

America urgently needs to build up its military readiness in the Arctic where melting summer sea ice is setting up a global struggle for resources, a study prepared for the US navy has warned. The report by the National Academy of Sciences warned that climate change could upset the delicate security balance in the Arctic – even among close allies – and that America is unprepared for the challenges ahead. "The US military as a whole has lost most of its competence in cold-weather operations for Arctic weather," the report, National Security Implications of Climate Change for US Naval Forces, warned. "In the immediate term, the navy should begin Arctic training and the marine corps should also establish a cold weather training programme." The report warned that America was currently unprepared to defend its interests in the Arctic. Current submarine sytems would be challenged to operate in the Arctic, the report warned. In addition, the coastguard has just three ice breakers, and these are old and obsolete. It went on to call on the navy to develop an Arctic observer and research service, with remote sensing equipment such as satellites and drones. "Even the most moderate predicted trends in climate change will present new national security challenges for the US navy, marine corps, and coastguard," said Frank Bowman, a retired US navy admiral and co-chair of the committee that produced the report. "Naval forces need to monitor more closely and start preparing now for projected challenges climate change will present in the future," Bowman said.

### Sugar Ethanol

BioD is key to Big Pharma –declining diversity hurts the industry

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(Charlotte and Annelisa, Environmental Finance, “Big pharma’s biodiversity issue”,

<http://www.environmental-finance.com/features/view/590> SW)

The pharmaceutical sector faces a range of business risks linked to its reliance and impacts upon biodiversity and ecosystem services (BES). But those exposures and how effectively they are managed vary between companies and, while the sector’s environmental impacts are reasonably well understood, its reliance on biodiversity and healthy ecosystems are less so. These were the key findings of research performed by the Natural Value Initiative and KPMG Sustainability on behalf of Dutch asset manager Robeco, which reviewed the risk exposure of 10 companies in the pharmaceutical sector (see table below). As part of a broader focus on risks and opportunities associated with biodiversity and ecosystem services within its investment portfolio, Robeco commissioned KPMG Sustainability and the Natural Value Initiative to identify those pharmaceutical companies that are positioning themselves well to deal effectively with an increasingly resource-constrained world. The results of the study are being used by Robeco to prioritise its engagement with companies in the sector in which it has an interest. In 2005, a UN-backed study, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, estimated that 60% of ecosystem services on which we rely are degraded or in decline. This loss of BES has implications for companies across many sectors, either directly or through their supply chains. The pharmaceutical sector – as with most industries – both impacts on and is dependent on biodiversity and ecosystem services. Its dependence stems from the use of active ingredients from nature in drug discovery and manufacture, the use of water and a reliance on inert raw materials such as fish oils, soya and palm oil in drug manufacture. Impacts include water pollution from drug manufacturing and use, overexploitation of active ingredients from nature that cannot be readily synthesised and the use of inert ingredients linked with environmental degradation. For the pharmaceutical sector this may pose reputational, operational, regulatory and market risks as well as conferring competitive advantage through the provision of opportunities for the development of new and innovative drugs. Although these risks are unlikely to be significant for the sector in the short term, BES decline may become a systemic risk issue in the medium term. Increasing societal concerns regarding BES decline and shifting economic conditions such as increasing commodity prices could accelerate this process. Realising competitive advantage

In 2002, it was estimated that 42% of sales of the world’s 25 top-selling drugs were linked to natural products. This figure is thought to be significantly less in 2011, but nevertheless still substantial. Many companies closed down their bioprospecting activities in the past decade, preferring instead to rely on molecular synthesis and combinatorial chemistry. However, those companies that still have natural product discovery departments see a competitive advantage in doing so. According to one estimate, at current rates of plant and animal extinction the earth is losing one major drug every two years. This loss could impact on innovation in the sector in future, leading to loss of revenue. “Natural products (such as penicillin, cyclosporine, taxol, romidepsin or cone snail peptides) provide companies active in that field with a competitive advantage by providing access to active ingredients that simply would not be synthesised in a lab,” sayd Frank Petersen, executive director of the natural products unit at Novartis. “Furthermore, the study of natural substances can help to better understand disease-related pathways opening up new opportunities in drug discovery.” Regulatory and compliance risk Emerging regulations such as the Nagoya Protocol – with its provisions for access to genetic resources and the equitable sharing of benefits arising from their use – pose both a risk and an opportunity for companies. The protocol requires signatories to ensure that users of genetic resources adhere to a range of requirements, including ensuring free and prior informed consent of local communities, mutually agreed terms for resource use and monetary or non-monetary benefits (such as training, education and capacity building) arising from the commercialisation of products based on genetic resources. Failure to do so may lead to refusal of patent applications, reputational risk and loss of revenues. Value and competitive advantage can also be derived (in both brand and operational terms) depending on how the company responds to the issue. By ensuring equitable benefit sharing of genetic resources with local communities, for example, companies can strengthen relationships with local stakeholders and gain access to new materials for drug discovery, leading to enhanced innovation and competitive advantage. Security of supply risks Drug approval systems such as those administered by the US Food and Drug Administration include consideration of the sustainability of harvesting practices. Companies are required to demonstrate sustainability and put in place mitigation actions for impacts identified. Reliance on wild caught species is considered to be a risk by the industry that is managed through the creation of synthetic alternatives. Although this may be more costly, failure to create alternatives may lead to supply-related risks. “Several of the active ingredients in Sanofi’s major drugs are derived from natural plant or animal extracts,” says Dietmar Schummer, the company’s senior scientist. He cites the oncology drug, Taxotere, whose precursor compound is extracted from the needles of yew trees and treated by semi-synthesis, and Artesunate, an anti-malarial drug derived from wormwood. “All of these are either cultivated or synthesised from sustainable accessible precursor compounds, following a longstanding trend within the industry to synthesise active ingredients rather than rely on natural sources for drug manufacture, which may present security of supply issues.” Pharmaceutical companies depend on continued access to high-quality water in drug manufacturing Some pharmaceutical companies still depend on wild species for some drugs. Increasing scarcity of raw materials as a result of ecosystem services failure or overexploitation may lead to disruption of operations or higher input costs. One of the companies researched, for example, uses squalene from sharks’ livers derived as a by-product of commercial fisheries as an ingredient in its swine flu vaccine. It cannot yet be manufactured and sharks are globally in decline. Pharmaceutical companies also depend on continued access to high-quality water in drug manufacturing – albeit to a lesser extent than some other industries. Failure to consider the needs of multiple users of a catchment area (including wildlife) in water management plans may lead to a subsequent inability to obtain water in the right quantity and quality, and result in reputational and security of supply issues. BES remain important to guarantee the supply of agriculturally-based inert ingredients in drug manufacturing, including sugar, fish oils, vegetable oils from soya, canola, palm oil and sunflower seeds and timber in packaging. Although potentially only sourced in small amounts, some of these ingredients depend on ecosystem services such as pollinators, healthy soils and sufficient water for irrigation. Degradation of these services may lead to narrowing of profit margins through increased sourcing costs. Reputational risks Many of the commodities referred to above – in particular, soya, palm oil and fish oils – have been linked with environmental degradation and are at risk of overexploitation and therefore pose a reputational risk. The extent of this risk is not yet clear. Water consumption by pharmaceutical companies and product consumption by patients can impact on water quality. Most water pollution from pharmaceuticals arises from the fact that medicines are excreted without being properly metabolised by patients. This may have an impact on human health as well as the environment through the accumulation of higher concentrations of drugs in water bodies. Limited research has been undertaken to examine how drugs interact in the environment and evidence on the potential impacts on human health is inconclusive. There is, however, some evidence to suggest potential impacts on wildlife. For example, increased oestrogen (from the birth control pill and hormone replacement therapy) in water can lead to feminisation of fish and declines in fertility, and can impact on the sustainability of wild fish populations. “Only two companies were moving to understand their potential exposure in terms of reputational risk and security of supply.”

Nuke conflict

Matthias Rath 03 M.D., Physician writing to the ICC, June 14 [“In the Name of the People of the World – Complaint Against Genocide and Other Crimes against Humanity Committed in Connection with the Pharmaceutical ‘Business With Disease’ and the Recent War Against Iraq”, <http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:70TrwnOXUOIJ:www.laleva.cc/The\_ Hague/hague\_complaint.pdf+icc+pharma+criminal+court+complaint+text&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us&client=firefox-a>]

“For decades, the Pharma-Cartel has made every effort to protect its global business with patented drugs and to ban the dissemination of competing non-patentable health alternatives. This effort is conducted at the international level, by infiltration of the European Parliament and the abuse of the World Health Organization and other United Nations Organizations. Now, with the largest investment industry on planet Earth being exposed as an organized fraud business - haunted by tens of thousands of liability law-suits - immediate and global industry protection laws have become an urgent measure to cover up these crimes and to cement the continued control of the investment “business with disease” over human health worldwide. These far-reaching protection laws for an organized fraud-business implied the curtailing of civil rights and other drastic measures that could not be implemented during peacetime. The implementation of these measures required the escalation of an international crisis, a series of military conflicts that deliberately factors in the use of weapons of mass destruction and the triggering of a World War. Only then would there exist a global psychological situation that would allow abandonment of civil rights, passing of martial laws and the global implementation of protection laws allowing the accused to continue their ’business with disease’ and other crimes. In this situation, the pharmaceutical industry became the single largest corporate donor to the election of George Bush in order to exert direct influence over the most powerful political and military center in the world. With the election of George Bush, the Rockefeller investment group had direct access to the White House, the Pentagon and the political decisions taken there. A similar influence was exerted by the Rothschild group on the government of Tony Blair in Great Britain. Thus, it was no surprise that the two largest export nations of pharmaceutical products, the United States of America and Great Britain, spearheaded the current international crisis and instigated the war against Iraq. The alleged necessity for this war was presented to the people in America, Great Britain and the world under the false pretence of a global fight against ‘terrorism’, elimination of rogue governments and the crusade against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Thus, the same corporate interest groups and the same political stakeholders responsible for millions of deaths from the continued business with disease are now also responsible for risking the unnecessary death of tens of thou sands of innocent people in Iraq and for the death of young soldiers in America, Great Britain and other countries. They are responsible for starting and conducting a war of aggression against Iraq without any international mandate. They are responsible for the enslavement, plunder and other crimes currently being conducted in occupied Iraq.”

If these interest groups and their political stakeholders are not held accountable for these crimes immediately, they are likely to continue the escalation of the international crisis with the ultimate risk of a war with weapons of mass destruction.”

Environmental disasters are inevitable – industrialization will make them significantly worse in the future

Quarantelli, 92 – E. L., University of Delaware (“THE ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS OF THE FUTURE WILL BE MORE AND WORSE BUT THE PROSPECT IS NOT HOPELESS,” Disaster Research Center, http://dspace.udel.edu:8080/dspace/handle/19716/574)Red

Increases in Disaster Agents and Occasions 1. There are new and escalating kinds of technological accidents and mishaps that were almost non-existent prior to World War II and that will increasingly result in disasters. To the category of so-called natural hazards the human race has been increasingly adding a relatively newer category of technological accidents and mishaps. These are the disasters in the technological area resulting from human errors and collective mistakes of groups. To the \*\*Acts of God", we have now added the ItActs of Men and Womennt or 'tSocietyqt. Technological hazards are a relatively new class of danger which contemporary society is only just beginning to recognize. Disaster wrought by the unintended consequences of technology has largely been a product of the large-scale industrial development initiated by the 18th century industrial revolution. Mishaps associated with technology have occurred since the first tool was developed by a human. However, the scale of consequences, in terms of social disruption and the endangering of the social infrastructure, only reached significant proportions with the development of large industrial complexes to mass produce myriad goods. This and the activities associated with industrialization--the discovery and invention of new energy sources together with largescale production and storage requirements; the establishment of transportation modes, haulage routes and depots; the need for disposal of unwanted wastes; increasing amounts and dangers from atmospheric pollutants; the development of mass transit modes, networks and stations--have produced conditions which have jeopardized public safety and enlarged community vulnerability. Unfortunately, because of the increase in industrialization, they will increasingly create greater risks and eventual disasters. The major technological threats are currently in the chemical and the nuclear area. The manufacture, processing, transportation or distribution, storage, and the application or use of many products of these two areas are inherently hazardous. They almost insure quantatively more and qualitative worse future disasters. a. The chemical area. Chemicals have truly transformed the world and modern societies are impossible without them; their use reflects a widespread desire to have higher standards of living and particular lifestyles which otherwise could not be achieved. The technology of chemistry has been consciously developed and applied because of the perceived and actual benefits involved. However, there are multiple risks associated with the production, transportation, storage and use of dangerous chemicals for there are multiple ways in which human and other organisms, plant life and fauna, and physical material objects can be destroyed, damaged or other directly negatively affected by a dangerous chemical. A chemical emergency or disaster can involve many perilous happenings unlike a typical earthquake or a volcanic eruption. The referents of the term “chemical hazard" are multiple . Even localities which in the past had none or few risks from natural disaster agents, are now vulnerable if they have any roads, railways or navigable waterways in the vicinity of toxic chemical spills, explosions, or fires. In a sense, the development of major transportation infrastructures has reduced the geographic selectivity of possible disaster impacts. Almost any inhabited areas of societies have now become vulnerable to disasters from hazardous chemicals even though there be no manufacturing, storage or use facilities in the vicinity. Not all developed societies or communities within them are subject to major natural hazard threats; but now almost all are as they are increasingly subject to risk as dangerous chemicals'are more and more moved around. Furthermore, the threat of greater disasters of this kind is increasing because of the greater amounts of dangerous material involved. In addition, to the in-plant and transportation kinds of acute chemical types of disasters, we have also been adding the more slowly developing and diffuse types associated with hazardous waste sites. Love Canal and Times Beach in the United States as well as Seveso in Italy are examples of what we may expect more in the future. In fact, the Seveso Directive issued in 1982 by the Council of European Communities accepts the probability of such future disasters by attempting to set as legal policy the idea that citizens must be adequately informed of the nature of and extent of existing hazards, the planning measures being undertaken, and what might be expected of a disastrous occasion. b. The nuclear area. Another increasing source of danger is the nuclear power industry. It has less than a half century existence. But it was developed because it initially seemed to offer a relatively dependable and relatively inexpensive source of energy especially for industrial expansion, compared with other energy sources such as oil which was seen as eventually depletable and increasingly costly to obtain. A move in the direction followed made much economic sense. However, the risks associated with nuclear power has been illustrated, first by Three Mile Island, then Chernobyl. We may expect more along those lines given that there are over 435 commercial nuclear plants in existence at present. It should be noted that such a happening could pale the negative effects and consequences of Chernobyl, which contrary to much popular and even official thinking was far from a worst case scenario. Apart from in-plant nuclear plant problems there are the risks associated with the transport of nuclear wastes over long distances. In the long run any society that presently has nuclear plants will be faced with the problems stemming from their necessary and eventual decommissioning. The large volumes of radioactive wastes resulting from the dismantling of such nuclear facilities will pose problems of disposal. The material is going to have to be transported from many places to some chosen sites, and naturally that raises the probability of some accident in all countries undertaking such transportation. 2. There are technological advances that reduce some hazards but add complexity to old threats. Of course modern technology can and is used to try to eliminate or reduce some risks. The medical health area is marked by any number of such successful efforts. Unfortunately, sometime the positive consequences are accompanied by negative effects of a different kind. There are two aspects to this: (1) preventive or protective measures which indirectly lead to other kinds of possible disastrous occasions, and, (2) the scale of chain reactions possible in modern societies which as a result of network linkages can turn a minor emergency into a major disaster. An example of the first is fires in high rise buildings. In combination with the highly combustible and toxic construction and furnishing materials presently used, they have brought an additional threat dimension to that kind of situation. We prevent people from being burned by raising the probability of their being asphyxiated. Even plane crashes are interesting along this line. Research has shown that the ensuing fires generally kill more passengers than the crash itself. Eighty percent of those that do die from the fire actually succumb to the gas and smoke from the lightweight burning cabin material! It is more economically to use less heavy material which however is not fire proof. Technology sometimes is used in efforts to improve safety and reduce the possibilities of accidents and mishaps. This is a laudable effort but not necessarily always achieved. This can partly be seen in the following quotation from Lee Thomas, a one time head of the US Environmental Protection Agency. He said: It is entirely possible that somewhere in the country toxic metals are being removed from the air, transferred to a waste water stream, removed again by water pollution controls, converted to a sludge, shipped to an incinerator and returned to the air. He is pointing to the fact that many technologies that reduce or prevent the development of certain kinds of risk or environmental threats do so by solutions that can generate their own dangers. As another example, in meeting the Clean Water Act of 1972 in the United States, the waste water treatment of sewage can lead to the production of sludge which will contain viruses, toxic substances and heavy metal. The sludge can be treated, but this will frequently produce methane gas and carbon dioxide. The latter in turn may contribute to the greenhouse effect which is warming the earth, which can lead to changing climatic and agricultural patterns, and may contribute to the melting of the polar ice caps and the subsequent rise of ocean levels. This last point is a controversial one, but if accepted, it indicates the probable flooding of many seaport cities in the developed world. So, an initial good measure may set off a chain reaction of bad effects. But the linkages between happenings which may have ultimate negative effects, can be even more direct. This is because as technologies are elaborated and enlarged to meet the economics of scale, a small mishap at one point can bring down the total network or system. It has been noted that while small scale failure can be produced very rapidly, but that large scale ones can only be produced if large amounts of time and resources are involved. For example, there have always been electric power system failures. In fact, outages occur on a small scale almost every day even in developed societies. They are recognized as such, and coped with as normal emergencies by the public utilities. But not only can something in a far distant place have local effects, but the complicated linkages almost insure that sooner or later there will be large scale effects as in the widespread blackout in 1965 which occurred in southern Canada and the northwest United Sates. Perhaps many of the potential problems are summarized in a statement by an expert on telecommunications networks. He stated that the public switched networks are becoming more vulnerable to disruption because of the introduction of new technologies. Because of economic incentives to cut the costs of normal commercial operations, networks being developed are being designed without sufficient attention to emergency preparedness. Accidents, and disasters threaten networks of tomorrow with more extensive damage than they did yesterday's integrated network. Our Information Society relies on smoothly functioning communication networks, so consequences of network failure will be more severe. 3. New versions have developed of old or past dangers. Certain dangers that take particular forms have been around for centuries. But in modern societies, new versions of the risks involved have taken new forms especially as large scale cities have come into being. Inevitably these kinds of communities require elaborate lifeline systems that literally are the physical or mechanical infrastructures on which they rest. For a small village, a well or two can provide the necessary water; for metropolitan areas, distant reservoirs, dams, pumping stations, pipelines and gauges, monitoring points, etc. linked together in complicated ways are needed to generate and distribute the water. This can create new versions of old or past dangers. For example, droughts used to be thought of as mostly a rural problem. This is no longer the case. Increasingly in different parts of the world, urban and metropolitan localities are finding themselves faced with shortages or reduced water supplies. In the future there will be a disaster if a major section or all of an urban area runs out of water or has enough only for the most necessary of water needs. This is most likely to occur in combination with the collapse of a major tunnel, pumping station or other critical facilities of a water supply system. This last probability is increasing because of a deteriorating physical and public works infrastructure of lifeline systems in a large number of older cities. The prevalence of decaying bridge and tunnel structures, crumbling highways, obsolete and overloaded waste water and sewerage treatment plants, worn out sewer and water mains, aging subway systems, suggest a variety of many potential disastrous possibilities beyond the isolated and occasional accidents of the past. There are also aging pipeline systems that were initially put in place for an expanding industrial sector. None of the actual or potential disasters we have mentioned above are totally new, at least in the geophysical or physical sense, but they represent new versions of old threats, either because of where they could occur or the large scale nature which they can assume. 4. There is the emergence of new kinds of technological accidents and mishaps that can and will lead to disasters. a. Developments in computer technology. A major new threat that is developing is associated with all the disastrous consequences that will come from the computer revolution that human society is presently undergoing. Use of computers undoubtedly have improved disaster planning and managing, as well making life easier for most of us in many ways. But our increasing dependence on computer technology will magnify future disasters and turn some minor emergencies into major crises. This is particularly true in that many sectors of government and business are increasingly computer based for the data and information they need to function, sometimes literally from minute to minute. Thus, it can be predicted with certainty that computer systems and their networks will, for various reasons, cease to function, or function incorrectly (and we leave aside deliberate sabotage by the use of computer viruses). We will then have a really new kind of disaster--a computer disaster, with all kinds of negative chain reactions of an economic and social nature. b. Biotechnological advances. There are also going to be disasters that will be produced by biotechnology, especially genetic engineering. Basically, this technology involves altering the blueprint of living organisms-plant, animal or human--and creating new characteristics, some of which are very useful (e.g., various kinds of oil and chemical waste eating bacteria have been created that can be used to help clean up spills!). However, there clearly are all kinds of potential disaster possibilities with this kind of technology. There can be and will be the creation of, or the escape from control of, some altered organism that cannot be checked by present known means. Our ability to custom design living organisms almost insures that one day there will be some almost Frankenstein-like bacteria, plant or animal let loose on the world. We feel as confident in making the assertion that biotechnology will similarly bring us a major disaster sooner or later. In fact, just as the 1970s was the’time when the world became aware of nuclear power threats, the 1980s of the chemical hazards risks, the decade of the 1990s could very well be when we have a Chernobyl or Bhopal-scale like biotechnological disaster. We are not anti-nuclear power, against the development of new although hazardous chemicals, or anti-genetic engineering; the industries and activities involved have and will continue to improve human and social life. But it is a fact that they also bring with them certain risks that will produce major disasters. 5. There will be an increase in multiple or synergistic type disasters resulting in more severe impact consequences. There has been very little recognition given to the fact that natural disaster agents will increasingly generate or magnify concurrent technological disasters (and even possibly in the other direction). Increasingly so, because of the increased production, transportation and storage of hazardous substances of all kinds, natural disaster agents which in the past would have simply been natural disasters can now create technological disasters. For instance, a flood could inundate a chemical plant complex. The convergence of a tornado and a radiologically active cloud could pose a very threatening situation. As an example, in 1961, windstorms spreading radioactive material (plutonium and strontium) in the Lake Karachay region in the Southern Urals increased by about 30 to 50% the land area previously contaminated by an earlier nuclear disaster in Russia. The earlier technological disaster was magnified by a later natural disaster agent. Not often noticed is that at least hypothetically is that this process could also go in the other direction. For example, an MIT study recently suggested that continuing pollution may result in stronger hurricanes. Continued air pollution that increase carbon dioxide levels, according to this research, could make some hurricanes up to 60% stronger in the next century. This last example suggests that not only are disaster agents and occasions increasing, but that because of human and group behavior, there will be an enlargement of social risks and vulnerabilities in the future, a matter to which we now turn.

Robust peer reviewed evidence indicates ecosystems are resilient

McDermott, 09 [ Tree Hugger.Com,” Good news: most ecosystems can recover in one lifetime from human induced or natural disturbance”, <http://www.treehugger.com/files/2009/05/most-ecosystems-can-recover-from-disturbance-in-one-lifetime.php>]

There's a reason the phrase "let nature take its course" exists: New research done at the [Yale University School of Forestry & Environmental Science](http://environment.yale.edu/) reinforces the idea that ecosystems are quiet resilient and can rebound from pollution and environmental degradation. Published in the journal [PLoS ONE](http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi/10.1371/journal.pone.0005653), the study shows that most damaged ecosystems worldwide can recover within a single lifetime, if the source of pollution is removed and restoration work done: Forests Take Longest of Ecosystems Studied The analysis found that on average forest ecosystems can recover in 42 years, while in takes only about 10 years for the ocean bottom to recover. If an area has seen multiple, interactive disturbances, it can take on average 56 years for recovery. In general, most ecosystems take longer to recover from human-induced disturbances than from natural events, such as hurricanes. To reach these recovery averages, the researchers looked at data from peer-reviewed studies over the past 100 years on the rate of ecosystem recovery once the source of pollution was removed. Interestingly, the researchers found that it appears that the rate at which an ecosystem recovers may be independent of its degraded condition: Aquatic systems may recover more quickly than, say, a forest, because the species and organisms that live in that ecosystem turn over more rapidly than in the forest.

Biodiversity loss is empirically denied and there is a litany of alternate casualties

Bruno, associate professor UNC Chapel Hill, 10 [John F., May 3, “[Biodiversity Loss Continues Unabated Despite International Efforts](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-f-bruno/biodiversity-loss-continu_b_561699.html)”, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-f-bruno/biodiversity-loss-continu_b_561699.html>]

Betting on biodiversity loss is a pretty sure thing. The earth's plant and animal species are disappearing at a sobering rate due to pressures including habitat loss, climate change, pollution and over-harvesting. Despite a few success stories and steps in the right direction, we are falling far short of stemming these losses. [Biodiversity](http://www.unep.org/iyb/about_iyb.asp#biodiv) is the entire range of biological variety in the world, including the diversity of genotypes, species and ecosystems. It can be measured on levels from DNA molecules all the way up to broad taxonomic categories such as families and phyla. Monitoring the fate of any of these aspects of biodiversity at a global scale is a daunting task. Thus, we know little about the rates and patterns of biodiversity loss or the effectiveness of global mitigation plans such as the [2002 Convention on Biological Diversity.](http://www.iucn.org/iyb/iucn/convention_on_biological_diversity/)   [Dr. Stuart Butchart](http://www.unep-wcmc.org/latenews/PressRelease.htm) of the [UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre](http://www.unep-wcmc.org/) and [BirdLife International](http://www.birdlife.org/) tackled the problem by assembling an international team of conservation scientists (that I was part of) to calculate trends in global biodiversity. The idea was to assemble several dozen indices that we had sound, long term data for including population trends for birds and other vertebrates and the loss of habitats such as forests, seagrass beds and coral reefs. As we recently reported in *Science* magazine, our analysis indicates that biodiversity has continued to decline over the past four decades with no detectable abatement for most indices. This is largely due to increased pressures resulting from human population growth, economic development and globalization but it also seems clear that our international response to the biodiversity crisis has been inadequate. Every aspect of biodiversity on earth is unique. The species that we have already driven extinct, from the [Dodo](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dodo) to the [Tasmanian Tiger](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thylacine), can never be resurrected or replaced. As a field ecologist, I have been lucky to experience and work on some truly wondrous examples of the earth's biodiversity from the tide pools of the Pacific Northwest to rainforests in Costa Rica to alpine habitats in the Rocky Mountains. The downside of my otherwise fantastic job is that I witness the degradation of nature firsthand. The coral reefs of the Florida Keys of today bear little resemblance to the underwater jungles patrolled by large sharks that I snorkeled over as a kid 35 years ago. Over the last two decades I have observed and documented striking biodiversity losses even on isolated and seemingly untouched reefs.

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### Case

#### Biodiversity key to the pharmaceutical industry

Young, 99 President Elect at Canadian Society for Pharmaceutical Science

Co-director at Centre for Drug Research and Development (CDRD)

Professor at Simon Fraser University (Robert N, Pure Applied Chemistry, “Importance of biodiversity to the modern pharmaceutical industry”, Vol 71, No 9, pgs 1655-1661, <http://www.iupac.org/publications/pac/pdf/1999/pdf/7109x1655.pdf> SW)

The preservation of biodiversity throughout the world is of importance to the human population and indeed to the stability of the entire world. The vast genetic variety available in terrestrial plants, animals and micro-organisms offers a wealth of possibilities for the betterment of mankind in the production of food, materials and medicine. It is the intention of this paper to present a personal view of the importance of biodiversity to the modern pharmaceutical industry with particular reference to examples available from Merck Research Limited. For modern pharmaceutical research, biodiversity equals chemical diversity. Natural products offer a vast source of chemical diversity and yield unusual and unexpected lead structures. Although not always understood, secondary metabolites often have important biological function and are generally produced by plants, animals and micro-organisms for specific reasons. As such, small molecules produced in this way have been `designed' by nature to interact with macromolecules (proteins, DNA, etc.) and thus modulate the function of such macromolecules. Natural products can derive not only lead structures but can often yield ready-made drugs.

#### Most pharma companies are heavily dependent on natural products – BioD is key to that

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Co-director at Centre for Drug Research and Development (CDRD)

Professor at Simon Fraser University (Robert N, Pure Applied Chemistry, “Importance of biodiversity to the modern pharmaceutical industry”, Vol 71, No 9, pgs 1655-1661, <http://www.iupac.org/publications/pac/pdf/1999/pdf/7109x1655.pdf> SW)

In the future, natural products will remain as important sources of new drugs and lead structures. With improving techniques of organic synthesis, plant fungal and bacterial culture and bioengineering, more and more complex substances will become readily available for testing, degradation or modification. Varieties of new techniques will enhance the discovery process and allow identification of active substances from complex mixtures. Newly evolving techniques such as fishing techniques, wherein extracts from complex mixtures are absorbed on affinity matrixes, including the target macromolecules, and then subsequently eluted off and identified by mass spectral and NMR techniques, will allow the identification of active substances in a more rapid and efficient fashion. It is clear that many plants and micro-organisms have not yet been studied and can serve as a vast source of potential lead substances. Many companies have been formed in the last decade to exploit natural products. Some such as Shaman Pharmaceuticals, Phytobiotech and Microbotanica, etc. have focused on natural products from tropical and other medicinal plants identified by native cultures around the world. Others such as PharmuMar, Aquaculture Technology and ChromaXome focus on natural products from marine organisms. Some of the most exciting and futuristic opportunities are being explored by companies applying new molecular biology techniques to find novel, natural and unnatural products. Companies such as Ecopharm concentrate on finding compounds from micro-organisms associated with plants that are resistant to insects, fungi or other infections. Several other companies, such as Ecopia Biosciences, Diversa, Microgenomics, Ambergene and Terragen Diversity are applying cloning techniques in attempts to sample so-called `uncultivatable micro-organisms' (which may represent 95±99% of existing micro-organisms!) [12]. Some companies such as Ariad, Diversa and Oceanix have reported on cloning techniques applied to such purposes. They have developed particular vectors which allow the incorporation of large fragments of DNA derived from unculturable soil bacteria into readily cultured hosts such as E. coli. It is hoped that these large DNA fragments (up to 300 kb) would include the necessary genes coding for particular small molecule biosynthesis and once cultured in the host bacteria, would derive interesting natural products which could be extracted and tested. The success of such techniques is yet to be demonstrated. Finally, a company, Kosan, is working to utilize a technique known as combinatorial biosynthesis. Polyketide biosynthesis (involved in the biosynthesis of a wide variety of phenolic and ketonic natural products) makes use of large multifunctional enzymes made up of repeating cassettes. The sequence of cassettes dictates the structure, substitution and oxidation state of the final product. They hope to use DNA manipulation techniques to add, subtract, or swap cassettes in random combinatorial fashion and therefore make large libraries of `unnatural natural products'. High throughput microscreening of such libraries would then hopefully identify interesting active compounds and the clones could be grown up and overexpressed in order to identify the active constituent. It is clear that as purification, identification and testing technology improve, more and more unique natural products will become of interest to the pharmaceutical industry. Even rare and difficulty available samples may derive interesting compounds and, with these techniques, structures can be determined. Advances in synthetic chemistry can now make available complex structures heretofore beyond easy reach. There is little doubt therefore that natural products will continue to have an important impact on the pharmaceutical discovery process and it is equally imperative that we all work to preserve the genetic diversity of the world of living species on this earth as a resource for future generations.

#### MAINTANENCE OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY KILLS MORE THAN ALL HISTORY’S WAR’S COMBINED – SUPPRESSION OF DISEASE CURE’S KILLS MILLIONS YEARLY

RATH FOUNDATION, DR RATH IS FMR DIRECTOR – CARDIOVASCULAR RESEARCH LINUS PAULING INSTITUTE, 2001 AWARD RECIPIENT FROM THE AMERICAN PREVENTIVE MEDICINE ASSOCIATION, AND MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN HEART ASSOCIATION, 5 [THE DR. RATH HEALTH FOUNDATION, MATTHIAS RATH, “THE PHARMACEUTICAL ‘BUSINESS WITH DISEASE’”, http://www4.dr-rath-foundation.org/PHARMACEUTICAL\_BUSINESS/pharmaceutical\_industry.htm]

There is an entire industry with an innate economic interest to obstruct, suppress and discredit any information about the eradication of diseases. The pharmaceutical industry makes over one trillion dollars from selling drugs for ongoing diseases. These drugs may relieve symptoms, but they do not cure. We have to realize that the mission of this industry is to make money from ongoing diseases. The cure or eradication of a disease leads to the collapse of a multi-billion dollar market of pharmaceuticals. I encourage you to read the key points about the nature of the pharmaceutical business and to think about each of them. Now you will understand why we are bombarded with advertising campaigns by pharmaceutical companies wanting to make us believe that they are “Searching for Cures” “ Striving for the Eradica-tion of Diseases” or “Increasing Life Expectancy” and other false promises. With these deceptive statements, the pharmaceutical industry has for decades been able to disguise the true nature of its business – maximum profit from ongoing diseases. The Pharmaceutical "Business with Disease" Causes More Deaths Than All Wars of Mankind Combined As a direct consequence of the pharmaceutical business, more people have died from preventable disease than in all wars of mankind combined. The following summarizes the steps leading to this tragedy. The fact that vitamin C stabilizes the walls of arteries, for example, has been known for 200 years, ever since James Lind uncovered vitamin C deficiency as the cause of blood loss and scurvy. Any head of a pharmaceutical company, any Ph.D. or M.D. who denies knowing this fact is simply incredulous. Why, then, was this information not applied to medicine in order to combat cardiovascular disease? Why was the official RDA for vitamin C set at 60 mg, an amount barely sufficient to prevent scurvy but certainly low enough to make sure that cardiovascular diseases will become an epidemic? The following page gives the answer. Throughout this century, the pharmaceutical companies knew that an optimum vitamin supply of the population would lead to the collapse of a multi-billion dollar market of prescription drugs. Moreover, vitamins are not patentable and the profit margins are low. On the basis of this analysis the survival of the pharmaceutical industry became dependent on two strategies: To obstruct research, information, and use of vitamins and other natural therapies by all means available. To promote the deception that patentable synthetic drugs are the answer to human diseases.

### K

#### Their legislation of ethics fails – working within the law perpetuates a conservative system that stifles change

Badiou, 93 – Alain, philosophy teacher at the Ecole Normale Superieure and the College International de Philosophie in Paris (*Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*, first published 1993, first published in English 2001, Verso, pp. 32 - 33)Red

The very idea of a consensual 'ethics', stemming from the general feeling provoked by the sight of atrocities, which replaces the 'old ideological divisions', is a powerful contributor to subjective resignation and acceptance of the status quo. For what every emancipatory project does, what every emergence of hitherto unknown possibilities does, is to put an end to consensus. How, indeed, could the incalculable novelty of a truth, and the hole that it bores in established knowledges, be inscribed in a situation without encountering resolute opposition? Precisely because a truth, in its invention, is the only thing that is for all, so it can actually be achieved only against dominant opinions, since these always work for the benefit of some rather than all. These privileged few certainly benefit from their position, their capital, their control of the media, and so on. But in particular, they wield the inert power of reality and time [de la realite et du temps] against that which is only, like every truth, the hazardous, precarious advent of a possibility of the Intemporal. As Mao Tse-tung used to say, with his customary simplicity: 'If you have an idea, one will have to split into two.' Yet ethics explicitly presents itself as the spiritual supplement of the consensus. The 'splitting into two' horrifies it (it smacks of ideology, it's passe. . .). Ethics is thus part of what prohibits any idea, any coherent project of thought, settling instead for overlaying unthought and anonymous situations with mere humanitarian prattle (which, as we have said, does not itself contain any positive idea of humanity). And in the same way, the 'concern for the other' signifies that it is not a matter - that it is never a matter - of prescribing hitherto unexplored possibilities for our situation, and ultimately for ourselves. The Law (human rights, etc.) is always already there. It regulates judgements and opinions concerning the evil that happens in some variable elsewhere. But there is no question of reconsidering the foundation of this 'Law', of going right back to the conservative identity that sustains it. As everyone knows, France - which, under Vichy, approved a law regulating the status of the Jews, and which at this very moment is voting to approve laws for the racial identification of an alleged internal enemy that goes by the name of 'illegal immigrant' [immigri clandestin]; France which is subjectively dominated by fear and impotence - is an 'island of law and liberty'. Ethics is the ideology of this insularity, and this is why it valorizes - throughout the world, and with the complacency of 'intervention' - the gunboats of Law. But by doing this, by everywhere promoting a domestic haughtiness and cowardly self-satisfaction, it sterilizes every collective gathering around a vigorous conception [pensee] of what can (and thus must) be done here and now. And in this, once again, it is nothing more than a variant of the conservative consensus.

#### This ethical framework is underwritten by the power to decide who should live and who should die – its ultimate conclusion is genocidal violence

Badiou, 93 – Alain, philosophy teacher at the Ecole Normale Superieure and the College International de Philosophie in Paris (*Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*, first published 1993, first published in English 2001, Verso, pp. 33 - 39)Red

We don’t endorse the gendered language in this evidence

But what must be understood is that this resignation in the face of (economic) necessities is neither the only nor the worst component of the public spirit held together by ethics. For Nietzsche's maxim forces us to consider that every non-willing (every impotence) is shaped by a will to nothingness, whose other name is: death drive. II Ethics as the Western mastery of death We should be more struck than we usually are by a remark that often recurs in articles and commentaries devoted to the war in the former Yugoslavia: it is pointed out - with a kind of subjective excitement, an ornamental pathos - that these atrocities are taking place 'only two hours by plane from Paris'. The authors of these texts invoke, naturally, all the 'rights of ~~man~~', ethics, humanitarian intervention, the fact that Evil (thought to have been exorcized by the collapse of 'totalitarianisms') is making a terrible comeback. But then the observation seems ludicrous: if it is a matter of ethical principles, of the victimary essence of ~~Man~~, of the fact that 'rights are universal and imprescriptible', why should we care about the length of the flight? Is the 'recognition of the other' all the more intense if this other is in some sense almost within my reach? In this pathos of proximity, we can almost sense the trembling equivocation, halfway between fear and enjoyment, of finally perceiving so close to us horror and destruction, war and cynicism. Here ethical ideology has at its disposal, almost knocking on the protected gates of civilized shelter, the revolting yet delicious combination of a complex Other (Croats, Serbs, and those enigmatic 'Muslims' of Bosnia) and an avowed Evil. History has delivered the ethical dish to our very door. Ethics feeds too much on Evil and the Other not to take silent pleasure in seeing them close up (in a silence that is the abject underside of its prattle). For at the core of the mastery internal to ethics is always the power to decide who dies and who does not. Ethics is nihilist because its underlying conviction is that the only thing that can really happen to someone is death. And it is certainly true that in so far as we deny truths, we thereby challenge the immortal disjunction that they effect in any given situation. Between ~~Man~~ as the possible basis for the uncertainty [alea] of truths, or ~~Man~~ as being-for-death (or being-for-happiness, it is the same thing), you have to choose. It is the same choice that divides philosophy from 'ethics', or the courage of truths from nihilism. III Bio-ethics This, no doubt, is what explains the privilege that ethics grants, among the 'social issues' that spice up our daily routine - and all the more so, in that none of them makes the slightest sense - to the never-ending debate on euthanasia. The word euthanasia poses the question very clearly: 'When and how, in the name of our idea of happiness, may we kill someone?' It names the stable core on which ethical sentiment depends. We all know the constant reference ethical 'thought' makes to 'human dignity'. And the combination of being-for-death and dignity constructs precisely the idea of a 'dignified death'. Commissions, reporters, judges, politicians, priests, doctors, debate the ethical definition, sanctioned by law, of a death administered with dignity. To be sure, suffering and degeneration are not 'dignified', do not conform to the smooth, young, well-nourished image that we have of ~~Man~~ and ~~his~~ rights. Who can fail to see that the 'debate' on euthanasia points above all to the radical poverty of the symbols available today for old age and death? To the unbearable character of the latter as a sight for the living Here ethics is at the junction of two only apparently contradictory drives: since it defines ~~Man~~ by non-Evil, and thus by 'happiness' and life, it is simultaneously fascinated by death yet incapable of inscribing it in thought. The upshot of this compromise is the transformation of death itself into a spectacle made as discreet as possible, a mere disappearing, regarding which the living have the right to hope that it will not disrupt their delusional habits of contented ignorance. Ethical discourse is thus both fatalist and resolutely non-tragic: it allows death to 'go about its business', without opposing to it the Immortal of a resistance. Let us remember - since such are the facts - that 'bioethics' and the State's obsession with euthanasia were explicit categories of Nazism. Fundamentally, Nazism was a thoroughgoing ethics of Life. It had its own concept of 'dignified life', and it accepted, implacably, the necessity of putting an end to undignified lives. Nazism isolated and carried to its ultimate conclusion the nihilist core of the 'ethical' disposition once it has at its disposal the political means to be something other than prattle. In this respect, the appearance in our country of major state commissions on 'bio-ethics' bodes ill. Here there will be loud cries of protest. It will be said that it is precisely because of Nazism that it is necessary to lay down the law protecting the right to life and to dignity, once the impetuous advances of science give us the means to practise all sorts of genetic ~~man~~ipulations. We should not be impressed by these cries. We should argue strongly that the necessity of such state commissions and such laws indicates that, in the configuration of public and private minds, the whole problematic remains essentially suspect. The conjunction of 'ethics' and 'bio' is in itself threatening. So is the similarity of prefixes between (evil) eugenics and (respectable) euthanasia. A hedonistic doctrine of 'dying-well' will make for no defence against the powerful and genuinely murderous aspiration of 'generating-well', an obvious component of 'living-well'. The root of the problem is that, in a certain way, every definition of ~~Man~~ based on happiness is nihilist. It is clear that the external barricades erected to protect our sickly prosperity have as their internal counterpart, against the nihilist drive, the derisory and complicit barrier of ethical commissions. When a prime minister,' the political eulogist of a civic ethics, declares that France 'cannot welcome [accueillir] all the misery of the world', ~~he~~ is careful not to tell us about the criteria and the methods that will allow us to distinguish the part of the said misery that we welcome from that part which we will request - no doubt from within detention centres - to return to its place of death, so that we might continue to enjoy those unshared riches which, as we know, condition both our happiness and our 'ethics'. And in the same way, it is certainly impossible to settle on stable, 'responsible', and of course 'collective' criteria in the name of which commissions on bio-ethics will distinguish between eugenics and euthanasia, between the scientific improvement of the white ~~man~~ and his happiness, and the elimination 'with dignity' of monsters, of those who suffer or become unpleasant to behold. Chance, the circumstances of life, the tangle of beliefs, combined with the rigorous and impartial treatment without exception of the clinical situation, is worth a thousand times more than the pompous, made-for-media conscription of bio-ethical authorities [instances] - a conscription whose place of work, whose very name, have a nasty smell about them. IV Ethical nihilism between conservatism and the death drive Considered as a figure of nihilism, reinforced by the fact that our societies are without a future that can be presented as universal, ethics oscillates between two complementary desires: a conservative desire, seeking global recognition for the legitimacy of the order peculiar to our 'Western' position - the interweaving of an unbridled and impassive economy [iconomie objective sauuage] with a discourse of law; and a murderous desire that promotes and shrouds, in one and the same gesture, an integral mastery of life - or again, that dooms what is to the 'Western' mastery of death. This is why ethics would be better named - since it speaks Greek - a 'eu-oudenose', a smug nihilism. Against this we can set only that which is not yet in being, but which our thought declares itself able to conceive. Every age - and in the end, none is worth more than any other - has its own figure of nihilism. The names change, but always under these names ('ethics', for example) we find the articulation of conservative propaganda with an obscure desire for catastrophe. It is only by declaring that we want what conservatism decrees to be impossible, and by affirming truths against the desire for nothingness, that we tear ourselves away from nihilism. The possibility of the impossible, which is exposed by every loving encounter, every scientific re-foundation, every artistic invention and every sequence of ernancipatory politics, is the sole principle - against the ethics of living-well whose real content is the deciding of death - of an ethic of truths.

## 1NR

### “You Guys”

#### Because male-based generics are a reinforcer of a system in which "man" in the abstract and men in the flesh are privileged over women and erases feminine specificity.

Bilger 02
Audrey "The Common Guy" Bitch Magazine < http://bitchmagazine.org/article/the-common-guy>

In “The Ascent of Guy,” a 1999 article in American Speech, Steven J. Clancy writes, “Contrary to everything we might expect because of the pressures of ‘politically correct’ putative language reforms, a new generic noun is developing right before our eyes.” Although Clancy doesn’t take issue with the development (as you could probably guess from his disparaging tone on the whole idea of feminist language reform), his report ought to make us stop and think. During the same decades in which feminist critiques of generic uses of “man” and “he” led to widespread changes in usage-no mean feat-”you guys” became even more widely accepted as an informal and allegedly genderfree phrase. What Clancy concludes is that English contains a “cognitive framework in which strongly masculine words regularly show a development including specifically male meanings (man, he, guy) along with gender nonspecific forms...whereas in English, feminine words do not undergo such changes.” In practice, that is, terms signifying maleness have been more readily perceived as universal than those signifying femaleness. Or, to put it another way, if you call a group of men “you gals,” they’re not going to think you’re just celebrating our common humanity.¶ And this should trouble us. After all, haven’t we been largely pleased by the way the media has worked to adopt at least a semblance of nonsexist language? Newscasters and other public figures make an effort to avoid obviously gender-biased words, and major publications such as the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal do the same. In spite of vocal criticism from those who view such shifts as preposterous, genuine feminist language reform has gained some ground. But as is the case with all advances brought about by feminism and other progressive movements, we need to stay on top of things-or else we may wake up one day to find them gone. This seemingly innocent phrase may be operating like a computer virus, worming its way into our memory files and erasing our sense of why we worry about sexism in language to begin with.¶ Up until a couple of years ago, I used the phrase as much as anyone, and I never gave it a thought. “You guys” sounds casual, friendly, harmless. In Southern California, where I live, it’s positively ubiquitous. When two female friends told me one day that it bothered them to be called “you guys,” my wounded ego began an internal rant: I’m a literature and gender studies professor, I know about language, I spend much of my time teaching and writing against sexism, and here were people whose opinions I valued telling me that I was being patriarchal. Impossible!¶ And then I started listening. I listened first to my own defensive indignation. Clearly, my friends had touched a nerve. Deep down I knew that they were right: Calling women “guys” makes femaleness invisible. It says that man-as in a male person-is still the measure of all things.¶ Once I copped to being in the wrong, I started hearing the phrase with new ears. Suddenly it seemed bizarre to me when a speaker at an academic conference addressed a room full of women as “you guys”; when a man taking tickets from me and some friends told us all to enjoy the show, “you guys”; and on and on. It was as if these speakers were not really seeing what was before their eyes. I experienced a sense of erasure, of invisibility.¶ Alice Walker, a vocal opponent of this usage, recounts how she and filmmaker Pratibha Parmar toured the U.S. supporting the film Warrior Marks and were discouraged to find that in question-and-answer sessions audience members continually referred to them as “you guys.” “Each night, over and over, we told the women greeting us: We are not ‘guys.’ We are women. Many failed to get it. Others were amused. One woman amused us, she had so much difficulty not saying ‘you guys’ every two minutes, even after we’d complained” (from “Becoming What We’re Called,” in 1997’s Anything We Love Can Be Saved ).¶ Because it took me the better part of a year to eradicate this usage from my own speech, and after hearing friends-whom I’ve encouraged to follow suit-apologize when they slip back into it, I feel like I understand the problem from the inside out. Most of us are familiar with the idea of internalized oppression, the subtle process by which members of disenfranchised groups come to accept their own lesser status. We need to recognize that accepting “guys” as a label for girls and women is a particularly insidious example of that process.

### T

#### Limits key in the context of engagement – meaning is inherently unclear

Resnick 1 (Evan, Assistant Professor and coordinator of the United States Programme at RSIS, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, 0022197X, Spring2001, Vol. 54, Issue 2, <http://web.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/detail?sid=1b56e6b4-ade2-4052-9114-7d107fdbd019%40sessionmgr12&vid=2&hid=24&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mth&AN=4437301>)

A second problem associated with various scholarly treatments of engagement is the tendency to define the concept too broadly to be of much help to the analyst. For instance, Cha's definition of engagement as any policy whose means are "non-coercive and non-punitive" is so vague that essentially any positive sanction could be considered engagement. The definition put forth by Alastair lain Johnston and Robert Ross in their edited volume, Engaging China, is equally nebulous. According to Johnston and Ross, engagement constitutes "the use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising power's behavior."(n14) Likewise, in his work, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy, Robert Litwak defines engagement as "positive sanctions."(n15) Moreover, in their edited volume, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, Richard Haass and Meghan O'Sullivan define engagement as "a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives."(n16) As policymakers possess a highly differentiated typology of alternative options in the realm of negative sanctions from which to choose--including covert action, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, containment, limited war and total war--it is only reasonable to expect that they should have a similar menu of options in the realm of positive sanctions than simply engagement. Equating engagement with positive sanctions risks lumping together a variety of discrete actions that could be analyzed by distinguishing among them and comparing them as separate policies.

#### The word “substantially” means that the government must play the main role.

CFR No Date (Code of Federal Regulations, Subpart 3.1—Safeguards, <http://www.acquisition.gov/far/html/Subpart%203_1.html>)

(3) “Participating substantially” means that the official’s involvement is of significance to the matter. Substantial participation requires more than official responsibility, knowledge, perfunctory involvement, or involvement on an administrative or peripheral issue. Participation may be substantial even though it is not determinative of the outcome of a particular matter. A finding of substantiality should be based not only on the effort devoted to a matter, but on the importance of the effort. While a series of peripheral involvements may be insubstantial, the single act of approving or participating in a critical step may be substantial. However, the review of procurement documents solely to determine compliance with regulatory, administrative, or budgetary procedures, does not constitute substantial participation in a procurement.

#### Economic engagement happens at the political level – distinct from private

Rao 3/15 (Nirupama, Indian ambassador to the United States, Remarks by Ambassador Nirupama Rao at the CSIS Statesmen's Forum, 3/15/13, <http://csis.org/files/attachments/130315_Ambassador_Speech_Final.pdf>)

The first of these studies, “BIT and Beyond”, examines the significance of a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) in the context of India US economic relations. The second and more recent study, by Ambassador HemantKrishan Singh and TincySoloman – highlights the changing nature of India U.S. trade and economic relations. The study suggests a possible framework for strengthening economic ties between the two countries, which comprises negotiations on concluding a BIT; creating a stable and predictable environment for foreign investments in India; maintaining continuity of political level direction prioritising bilateral economic engagement, including convening meetings of the Trade Policy Forum (TPF); a serious effort on the U.S side to ameliorate the concerns of India’s IT industry; enhancing India’s commitment to advanced Free Trade Agreements (FTAs); and, commencement of negotiation on a India-U.S FTA. While recognizing the ambitious dimensions of this agenda, the study concludes with robust optimism that, “…the politics of aspiration and progress will prevail, bringing the reward of mutual prosperity to these two great democracies…”

#### Also, determining topicality based on economic effect ruins precision and makes any policy topical

Baldwin 85 – David A., Professor of World Order Studies and Political Science at Colombia, Economic Statecraft, p. 33-36

Alternative Concepts

As with policy options, the value of a particular conceptualization is best measured by comparing it with available alternatives. Whereas economic statecraft is defined in terms of means, alternative concepts are usually defined in terms of actual or intended effects of a policy or in terms of the process by which the policy was made.

Foreign Economic Policy

The term "foreign economic policy" is sometimes used in much the same way as "economic statecraft" is used here. Other uses, however, should be noted. Benjamin Cohen and Robert Pastor define it in terms of governmental actions intended to affect the international economic environment.17 An important drawback to this conception is that it makes it definitionally impossible to consider foreign economic policy as an option when a statesman wants to affect the noneconomic aspects of the international environment, say the international climate of opinion with respect to the legitimacy of the government of Rhodesia. Rational adaptation of means to ends in foreign policy making is not facilitated by defining some policy options in terms of particular ends. Still another objection to this definition is that it says nothing about the means to be used, thus leaving open the possibility that the use of noneconomic techniques, such as threats of violence, could be considered foreign economic policy. Such a possibility strays needlessly from common usage.

I. M. Destler offers a definition of “foreign economic policy” in terms of the actual impact of governmental actions on foreign and economic concerns. This definition implies nothing whatever about either the means used or the effect intended; instead it focuses on the actual effects— intended or not. Thus, a nuclear war could be labeled as “foreign economic policy” if it had important side effects on foreign economic matters. Any conception of foreign economic policy that cannot differentiate between nuclear attack and trade restrictions is hopelessly at odds with common usage. Any conception of “policy” that ignores both means and ends is unlikely to be of much use in assessing the rationality of a given policy.

International Economic Policy

Stephen D. Cohen argues that the term "international economic policy" is preferable to the more commonly used phrase, "foreign economic policy." He contends that "international economic policy must be viewed as being a separate phenomenon, not a tool for use by either foreign policy or domestic economic policy officials." The reasons underlying Cohen's position can be summarized as follows: (1) "International economic policy" is the "preferable term because . . . policy making in this area must take account of too many questions of domestic. . . policy to be considered 'foreign.' " (2) "The term 'foreign economic policy' usually connotes a subdivision of foreign policy as a whole and is therefore an oversimplification." And (3) acceptance of international economic policy as a distinct policy area is the "best and quickest way" to improve understanding of the "forces of economics in international economic policy" and of "the global political impact of U.S. international economic policy."19 The following points, however, should be noted in response to Cohen's position: (1) Foreign policy has traditionally been defined in terms of attempts to influence foreigners, not in terms of the factors that should be taken into account in formulating the policy. The fact that making international economic policy requires consideration of foreign and domestic political and economic factors in no way distinguishes it from traditional conceptions of foreign economic policy. (2) It is not self-evident that treating foreign economic policy as a subdivision of foreign policy as a whole constitutes "oversimplification." Cohen provides little evidence or argument to support this contention. Indeed, from an a priori standpoint, it would seem simpler to consider international economic policy by itself than to treat it as part of a larger whole. Treating more variables may lead to overcomplexity, but it rarely leads to oversimplification. And (3) the question of whether Cohen's approach is the "best and quickest way" to enhance understanding is best answered after consideration of alternative

At least three common meanings of the term “economic sanctions” may be identified. The first is a rather narrow concept referring to the use of economic measures to enforce international law. The second refers to the types of values that are intended to be reduced or augmented in the target state. And the third usage corresponds to the concept of economic techniques of statecraft as used here. The first is narrowly legalistic and therefore unsuitable for general foreign policy analysis. The second emphasizes intended effects rather than the means for achieving those effects. The difficulty is that any or all of the policy instruments discussed in the previous chapter can be used to ‘affect the economic values in a target state. Diplomatic pressure on other states can be used to discourage trade with the target; propaganda can be used to undermine confidence in the target state’s currency; and military attack can be used to destroy factories. Thus, conceiving of economic sanctions in terms of the intended effects on the receiving state is no help at all in distinguishing economic from noneconomic tools of statecraft. The term “economic sanctions” is used in so many different ways that there is much to be said for avoiding it altogether. Unfortunately, the term is so deeply embedded in the literature of economic statecraft that ignoring it is impossible. Later chapters will therefore use this term, but only in its third sense.

#### The means of engagement determine whether it is “economic”, not the goals

Baldwin 85 – David A., Professor of World Order Studies and Political Science at Colombia, Economic Statecraft, p. 39-40

Choosing a concept of economic statecraft is not merely a matter of “semantic taste,” at least not if that is meant to imply that “there is no disputing matters of taste.” Some concepts are better suited for the analysis of governmental influence attempts than others. In comparison with available alternatives, the concept of “economic statecraft” has several advantages. The most important of these can be summarized as follows:

1. “Economic statecraft” emphasizes means rather than ends. This usage is probably closer to ordinary language than definitions in terms of ends. Bombing a library is not called cultural warfare; bombing homes is not called residential warfare; bombing nuclear reactors (with conventional bombs) is not called nuclear warfare; and bombing factories should not be labeled economic warfare. 2. “Economic statecraft” does not restrict the range of goals that may be sought by economic means. It makes it conceptually possible to describe the empirically undeniable fact that policy makers sometimes use economic means to pursue a wide variety of noneconomic ends. 3. “Economic statecraft” treats policy instruments as property concepts, thus facilitating the maintenance of a clear distinction between undertakings and outcomes. 4. Unlike most alternative concepts, the definition of “economic statecraft” includes a definition of “economic.” It thus provides criteria for distinguishing economic techniques of statecraft from noneconomic techniques.

#### Not a we meet: “Economic engagement” is defined by mechanisms, not goals

Scharfen 95 – John C., Marine Colonel, Planner with US Commander in Chief, Europe, The Dismal Battlefield: Mobilizing for Economic Conflict, p. 45

As defined here, the common element found in the categories of economic support, economic competition, economic coercion, and economic war is that each to some degree relies upon the use of the economic instrument to achieve an objective. However, only in economic competition is the objective purely economic. In economic support, coercion, and war, the objective routinely transcends economics arid will include political, military, and possibly even social goals. It is popular to equate economic conflict with economic sanctions and to define the term sanctions as being inclusive of all instruments of economic force. Such a generality deprives the policymaker of the capability to make distinctions among economic options or to rationalize a strategy that embraces the use of the economic instrument. Table 3 (chapter 6) offers a partial list of the instruments of economic force (including sanctions) that still require detailed definition and analysis.